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SUMMARY
We analyze issues arising from demand management in decentralized decision-making
environments. We consider logistics systems and supply chains, where companies’ opera-
tions are handled with independent entities whose decisions affect the performance of the
overall system. In the first study, we focus on a logistics system in the sea cargo industry,
where demand is booked by independent sales agents, and the agents’ capacity limits and
sales incentives are determined by a central headquarters. We develop models for the central
headquarters to analyze and optimize capacity allocation and sales incentives to improve
the performance of the decentralized system. We use network flow problems to incorporate
agent behavior in our models, and we link these individual problems through an overall
optimization problem that determines the capacity limits. We prove a worst-case bound on
the decentralized system performance and show that the choice of sales incentive impacts
the performance. In the second study, we focus on supply chains in the automotive indus-
try, where decentralization occurs as a result of the non-direct sales channels of the auto
manufacturers. Auto manufacturers can affect their demand through sales promotions. We
use a game theoretical model to examine the impact of “retailer incentive” and “customer
rebate” promotions on the manufacturer’s pricing and the retailer’s ordering/sales decisions.
We consider several models to determine which promotion would benefit the manufacturer
under which market conditions. We find that the retailer incentives are preferred when
demand is known. On the other hand, when demand is highly uncertain the manufacturer
is better off with customer rebates. We extend this research by analyzing a competitive set-
ting with two manufacturers and two retailers, where the manufacturers’ promotions vary
between retailer incentives and customer rebates. We find an equilibrium outcome where
customer rebates reduce the competitor’s profits to zero. We observe in numerical examples
that the manufacturers are able to increase their sales and profits with retailer incentives,




Many companies in different industries operate in decentralized systems where decision-
making authority is distributed among the members (agents) of the system instead of col-
lected into a single centralized body. Although in some cases decentralization may seem
impractical or inefficient, it is sometimes necessary because of the nature of industry and
operations. For example, manufacturers often find it useful to focus on the manufactur-
ing and supply side of the operations as their core competency while managing the sales of
their products through independent retailers who service and market to end consumers. The
management of decentralized systems is challenging because the individual members’ deci-
sions may be conflicting with each other, and their objectives may not be directly aligned
with that of the overall system. Designing effective decision support models that account
for the independent agent behaviors is of great importance since failing to incorporate those
may lead to very poor system performance. Optimization and game theory provide tools to
analyze and model decentralized systems. In this dissertation, we study decentralized prob-
lems in two application areas: sea cargo shipping and automotive industries. The research
problems in both areas were motivated from discussions with our industrial collaborators.
We integrate optimization with non-cooperative game theoretical tools to develop models
to optimize the performance of the decentralized system.
In the first part of this thesis (Chapter 2), we analyze a decentralized booking/reservation
system motivated by practices in some sea cargo companies. Seaborne shipping is the most
economical transportation mode for moving large volumes on long distances. Correspond-
ingly, the majority of the world trade volume is carried by ships. Both the world fleet and
the world’s seaborne trade have experienced continuous growth during the last few decades
Christiansen et al. [19] report that 5.625 million tons of goods were estimated to be moved
in 2002, representing a 33% increase during the last decade. In spite of its important role
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on the world economy, sea cargo industry operations and problems have not been inves-
tigated by as many researchers as in other areas. The majority of the work done in this
area deals with the routing and scheduling of the ships (Christiansen et al. [19]). Besides
these operational problems, some carriers are also interested in implementing effective book-
ing/reservation policies in order to manage their demand in the best possible way to match
with their capacity. Some sea cargo carriers employ a distributed (decentralized) booking
control where the firm (central headquarters) assigns aggregate capacity limits and sales
incentives to the decentralized sales agents who then manage cargo bookings from their loca-
tions while sharing the system resources. The central headquarters does not directly control
the agents’ decisions but can influence them through system design and incentives, with the
objective of generating high system revenues. We model the firm’s problem to determine the
best capacity allocation to the agents such that system revenue is maximized. This model
incorporates self-optimizing agent behaviors, which we model using network flow problems.
In the special case of a single-route, we formulate the capacity allocation problem as a mixed
integer program incorporating the optimal agent behavior. For the NP-hard multiple-route
case, we propose several heuristics for the problem. Computational experiments show that
the heuristics perform reasonably well and that the decentralized system generally performs
worse when network capacity is tight. We prove that the decentralized system may perform
arbitrarily worse than the centralized system when the number of locations goes to infinity,
although the choice of sales incentive impacts the performance. We develop an upper bound
for the decentralized system that gives insight on the performance of the heuristics in large
systems.
In the second part of the thesis (Chapters 3 and 4), we analyze sales promotions by
manufacturers that use non-direct distribution channels to sell their products. The mar-
keting and economics literature is quite rich in analysis of sales promotions with particular
focus on empirical investigations of the effects of promotions on the consumers’ purchasing
behaviors and the firms’ profits. The motivation for our research comes from the automo-
tive (auto) industry. In the auto industry, production costs are largely fixed and therefore
maximizing revenue is the main objective. Sales promotions such as cash rebate, dealer
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incentives, and low percent financing programs are frequently offered by the auto manufac-
turers to increase sales and revenues. The automotive research firm Edmunds.com reports
that the aggregate incentives offered by the auto manufacturers in the United States (U.S.)
market totaled $3.39 billion in April 2006. The sales promotions can be directed to the
end customers and/or retailers (dealers) in the distribution channels, and the promotional
choice may depend on demand characteristics faced by the manufacturers or the charac-
teristics of the manufacturers. We focus on “customer rebate” and “retailer incentive”
promotions, and we model the former as a per-unit payment from the manufacturer di-
rectly to the end customer and the latter as a lump-sum payment from the manufacturer to
the retailer. The main tradeoff is that customer rebates are given to every customer, while
the use of retailer incentives are controlled by the retailer. We study a game theoretical
model to examine the impact of these promotions on the manufacturer’s pricing and the
retailer’s ordering/sales decisions when the retailer can price discriminate. The auto dealers
do not generally announce fixed retail prices for their vehicles, but rather they negotiate
with the buyers and price discriminate accordingly. We consider several models with dif-
ferent demand characteristics and information asymmetry between the manufacturer and
the retailer, and determine which promotion would benefit the manufacturer under which
market conditions by characterizing the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium decisions. When
demand is deterministic, we find that retailer incentives may increase the manufacturer’s
profits (and sales) while customer rebates do not unless they lead to market expansion. We
study several extensions with deterministic demand, and we analyze the sensitivity of our
qualitative results to the model assumptions. When the uncertainty in demand (“market
potential”) is high, we show that a customer rebate can be more profitable than the retailer
incentive for the manufacturer. We provide additional insights through numerical examples
and empirical analysis of data from domestic auto industry.
Chapter 3 considers a monopolist manufacturer and retailer, and ignores competition,
which may be an important factor driving the promotional decisions of the manufacturers.
For example, an employee discount program, which was introduced by General Motors in
June 2005, was followed by Ford and Chrysler the next month. In Chapter 4, we extend
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the research on promotions in the auto industry to investigate the effects of competition on
the promotional decisions of the manufacturers. We analyze a setting with two competitive
manufacturers who sell their products at their exclusive retailers, who are also competi-
tors in the end market. Similar to the analysis in Chapter 3, we adopt a game theoretical
framework to model the interactions among the supply chain members, and we find the
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium decisions. We analyze a benchmark case where there
are no promotions offered by the manufacturers, and we compare the equilibrium outcomes
with those in the cases where the manufacturers offer retailer incentives or customer re-
bates. We provide several observations using numerical examples. We find that the retailer
incentives can be effective in improving the manufacturers’ sales and profits, although they
can be detrimental to the retailers’ profits under some market conditions. We characterize
equilibrium decisions where the manufacturers can benefit most from the customer rebates.
Unlike the monopolistic setting, we find that customer rebates can be effective in increasing
sales and profits of a manufacturer while driving the competitor’s profits to zero even when
demand is deterministic.
We review the relevant literature in the corresponding chapters. We summarize our
findings and present future research directions in Chapter 5.
4
CHAPTER II




The optimization of logistics systems has resulted in many improvements such as reduced
costs, shorter lead-times, and better customer service. However, most optimization models
have been designed to be used by a centralized planner who makes system-wide decisions,
while many organizations actually operate in a decentralized manner with agents making
independent decisions. The individual agents may make locally optimal decisions for the
part of the system that they manage, but in situations where they share resources, their
decisions may have negative consequences for the overall organization.
In practice, many examples of decentralized systems exist due to several reasons. For
example, decentralized decision-making can provide responsiveness and flexibility in han-
dling uncertainty in environments such as military operations, where individual units may
be authorized to make independent decisions in real-time Lin et al. [55]. Legal barriers to
centralization may also exist: franchise laws in the U.S. prohibit auto manufacturers from
selling vehicles directly to consumers, leading to decentralized distribution through inde-
pendent dealerships. For some environments, centralization may be prohibitively expensive,
very complex, or the coordination may be too much of a burden. This is especially true for
large systems, which would require substantial computational power to store and process
large amounts of information for centralized decision-making.
Decentralized systems are sometimes less efficient in terms of the system-wide perfor-
mance. For example, in a decentralized supply chain, the entire system may incur a revenue
loss of 25% due to a phenomenon called “double marginalization” Spengler [73]. Simply
applying centralized optimization models to decentralized systems may not be appropriate,
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but it may be possible to design and optimize the system to achieve good performance. A
classic example in the economics literature that analyzes decentralized decision-making is
the class of problems called Principal-Agent, where the principal contracts with the agent
for performing certain acts. (For further details on Principal-Agent problems, see for ex-
ample Tirole [79] or Varian [82].) In Principal-Agent problems, the utility of the agent
may not be directly aligned with that of the principal, thus the principal designs incen-
tives or mechanisms to achieve the desired performance in the decentralized system. The
Principal-Agent framework can be applied to decentralized logistics systems by developing
optimization models that incorporate individual behaviors and by designing incentives or
mechanisms to improve the system performance.
The motivation for our study comes from a decentralized booking practice in some sea
cargo companies that transport containerized cargo and provide liner service. Liner is one
mode of shipping operation in which the companies provide service according to regular
schedules and fixed itineraries or service routes Christiansen et al. [19]. In systems we
study, a sales agent is located at each port on a network of service routes, and he handles
cargo bookings that originate from his port. The sales agent earns revenue according to
the incentive determined by the central headquarters, e.g., a fixed proportion of the total
revenue generated by the agent’s bookings. The central headquarters assigns aggregate
capacity to each sales agent for total bookings out of the agent’s port, where the firm’s
objective is to maximize total revenue. This decentralized booking practice can be thought
of as a Principal-Agent problem where the principal is the central headquarters and the
agents are the sales offices that book cargo. The mechanisms are capacity allocation and
sales incentives, where the performance is measured by total system revenue.
In this research, we develop models for the central headquarters to analyze and optimize
capacity allocation and sales incentives to improve the performance of the decentralized sys-
tem. We use network flow problems to incorporate agent behavior in our models, and we
link these individual problems through an overall optimization problem that determines the
capacity limits to the agents and maximizes system revenue. For the special case of a single
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route, we formulate a comprehensive model including allocation decisions and agent behav-
ior to solve the problem, and in the NP-hard general case, we develop several heuristics
that consider agent behavior. We analyze the worst-case performance of the decentralized
system and develop an upper bound on the optimal revenue that provides insight on the
performance of the heuristics. Our computational results indicate that decentralized book-
ing control is generally worse when capacity is tight, and the heuristics perform reasonably
well and fast. The models that we develop can be used in rough-cut capacity allocation
planning and evaluating “what-if” scenarios for the system design. For example, the central
headquarters can use these models to determine allocation of capacity to agents, to choose
sales incentives, to evaluate investment in an expensive centralized booking system, or to
assess alternate designs of the network.
2.1.2 Literature Review
Research relevant to our work has been done in areas such as Principal-Agent analysis,
revenue management, sea cargo routing and scheduling, decentralized organizational design,
and network equilibria.
Principal-Agent problems are well-studied in the economics and operations management
literature. (See, for example, Corbett and De Groot [20], Iyer et al. [40], Tirole [79], and
Varian [82].) These problems arise in the field of non-cooperative game theory and include
applications to compensation of executives, contracting of workers, and management of
supply chains. Our work presents analysis of a Principal-Agent problem in a non-traditional
area, with agents booking cargo on a network of service routes.
Revenue management, which is a practice used in industries such as airline, car rental,
hotel and entertainment, is concerned with achieving maximum revenue from the sales of
perishable assets. The field of revenue management is relevant to the problem that we
study since price-differentiated cargo is transported using perishable ship capacity, and the
objective is to maximize revenue. For some examples of research in airline and air cargo
revenue management see Bertsimas and Popescu [7], Dror et al. [25], Glover et al. [35],
Karaesmen and van Ryzin [43], Kasiligam [44], and Kasilingam [45], or see McGill and van
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Ryzin [56] for a review. More recently, there has been interest in applying revenue manage-
ment techniques in the sea cargo industry; Lee et al. [54] analyze a revenue management
problem where the carrier decides which demands to satisfy or postpone as they are re-
quested by contract and non-contract shipping customers. While most research in revenue
management takes a centralized perspective on booking control, we focus on a decentralized
system.
There is also a body of literature that relates specifically to sea cargo beyond the last
example, most of which deals with the routing and scheduling of ships or moving empty
containers to match supply and demand. (See Christiansen [19] for a review.) Different
than the research in this stream, we take the ship routes and schedules as given, and we
focus on maximizing revenue in a decentralized system.
Some research related to decentralized systems has been done in the allocation of shared
resources in multi-level organizations. The most relevant ones to our study include Burton
and Obel [14] and Gazis [30]. In both papers, the authors analyze a problem where a central
organizing body distributes the total capacity of common resources to sub-units who make
individual decisions regarding these resources. In the formulations, feasibility for each
resource is ensured with a constraint that limits its overall usage to the available capacity.
Although the problem that we study is similar in concept, our problem is complicated by the
fact that the sales agents receive aggregate capacity limits for multiple network resources.
An effective distribution of the common resources that achieves high revenue requires us to
know the agents’ booking decisions, which is difficult to characterize on the network.
A number of papers have studied the loss of efficiency (i.e., the loss in a decentralized
system compared to a centralized one) in the context of Nash equilibria or network mod-
els. The term “price of anarchy” was first used in Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [49]
and Papadimitriou [65] to quantify the degree of loss in a restricted network. Some exam-
ples of research analyzing the price of anarchy in capacitated transportation networks and
competitive network environments include Correa et al. [22] and Johari and Tsitsiklis [42].
Perakis [67] generalizes the work in this stream by considering systems with non-separable,
asymmetric and nonlinear costs. The author finds that the loss due to decentralization can
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be unbounded in the worst case. Although the decentralized problem we study is different,
we show a similar worst-case result.
This chapter is organized as follows. We describe the problems that we address in
Section 2.2 with a focus on capacity allocation in the decentralized system. In Section 2.3,
we analyze a special case, present our heuristics and provide further theoretical analysis.
We present some observations from our computational study in Section 2.4 and conclude
with a summary of our findings in Section 3.4.
2.2 Models
In this section, we introduce some definitions, state our assumptions, and formulate the
problems that we analyze.
We are interested in networks that are composed of directed cycles (not necessarily
simple), which we call routes. A route is a sequence of ports that begins and ends at a
specific location in the network. We present an example in Figure 1 where the network
consists of a single route with revisitations that originates and terminates at Port 1. A leg
is identified by a pair of locations on a route that are visited consecutively by the asset, or
ship. Demand is in the form of Origin-Destination (O-D) pair requests. Ship capacity refers
to the number of containers a ship can carry on a particular route. Since liner operators
have regularly departing schedules (e.g., weekly) and we are interested in a system with
time-stationary parameters, thus we can view a snapshot of the network in time, with all
demand forecasts and capacities defined for the time period being studied. In practice, the
models we present can be solved in a rolling horizon, where reallocation of capacities to
















 Figure 1: A network with a single route and revisitations.
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Associated with each port on the network is a sales agent. In the problem we study, an
agent at a particular port only books freight leaving from that port; in practice that agent
has the most information about the booked cargo from his port and the feeder services into
and out of the port. Note that this is different than booking practices for most passenger
air travel, where travel agents can book demand to and from any location. The sales agent
optimizes his individual objective (independently of the other agents) based on the sales
incentive as determined by the central headquarters. Unless otherwise noted, we assume
that the sales incentive is based on total revenue, and we do not model sales effort or cost
as a function of the incentives. We use the term “agent” to represent the sales office at a
port and we assume that the sales office acts as one entity towards the common objective.
The central headquarters assigns capacity on a given ship and route to each agent on
that route; the capacity is an aggregate allocation that limits the total demand bookings
out of the agent’s port rather than a capacity limit for each leg or O-D pair. We assume that
the central headquarters has full information on prices and that O-D pair demand is known
by both sales agents and central headquarters. In practice, demand is often forecasted by
sales agents who give the information to central headquarters.
We assume there is no penalty associated with rejection of demand besides the lost
revenue. Since ship operating cost is largely fixed and does not depend on accepted demand,
we ignore this cost. We assume that customers are path indifferent, i.e., an O-D pair request
may be transported on any ship travelling between its origin and destination ports. We do
not allow transshipment and multiple loading/unloading of cargo. Finally, we assume that
each unit of demand is equal to one container of the same size.
We identify the following problems:
• Capacity Allocation Problem (CAP): CAP determines the optimal set of capacity
limits to allocate to each sales agent on each route. The central headquarters solves
CAP to maximize total revenue, while ensuring that the overall solution determined
from the agents’ booking decisions is feasible.
• Agent Problem (AP): AP determines the optimal set of accepted O-D pair demands
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for an agent. An individual sales agent solves AP to maximize his objective based on
the sales incentive, while guaranteeing that the number of accepted demands is within
his capacity limit as assigned by central headquarters.
• Central Problem (CP): CP determines the optimal set of O-D pair demands to
accept for the system to maximize total revenue, while ensuring overall feasibility.
Our focus is primarily on CAP. In order to model CAP, we need to understand an agent’s
behavior, therefore we analyze AP. In CP, all decisions regarding demand acceptance are
made in a centralized manner, therefore CP provides benchmark results for CAP.
Table 1 summarizes the main notation used in this chapter. For notational convenience,
the price per container for an O-D pair is the same regardless of the route chosen and the
type of cargo, and the capacity on each leg of a route is equal to the ship capacity on the
route.
We start by analyzing AP. An agent at port p receives the capacity limits ~ap and solves
his individual problem, which we call APp. We formulate APp as a minimum cost flow
problem following the representation in Ahuja et al. [1], and we construct the underlying
graph and choose the problem parameters according to our setting. (Minimum cost flow
problems are polynomially solvable and can be solved efficiently by specialized network flow
algorithms.)
The underlying graph consists of nodes corresponding to the O-D pairs (nk, k ∈ ODp),
routes (mr, r ∈ Rp) and a sink node (t) for feasibility. We denote the network for agent p
with Hp = (Np, Ap), where Np is the set of nodes and Ap is the set of arcs. The problem
parameters corresponding to the net supply at node i, (bi), the per unit cost of sending flow
on arc (i, j), (cij), and the upper bound on arc (i, j), (uij), are defined as follows:
Np = {t ∪ (
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Table 1: Main notation for Chapter 2
P : Set of ports or agents
Rp : Set of routes that visit port p
(∪p∈P Rp = R, where R denotes the set of all routes)
ODp : Set of O-D pairs that originate at port p
(∪p∈P ODp = OD, where OD denotes the set of all O-D pairs)
ODp : Set of O-D pairs for port p ordered by non-increasing prices
OD : Set of all O-D pairs ordered by non-increasing prices
opk, dpk : Origin, destination ports of O-D pair k
RRk : Set of routes such that a directed path exists from opk to dpk
Lr : Set of legs on route r
(denoted as L if |R| = 1, where |R| is the cardinality of the set R)
LLrk : Set of legs O-D pair k traverses on route r (denoted as LLk if |R| = 1)
Srl : Set of O-D pairs on route r using leg l ∈ Lr (denoted as Sl if |R| = 1)
capr : Ship capacity on route r (denoted as cap if |R| = 1)
pk : Price per unit demand shipped for O-D pair k
dk : Total amount of demand for O-D pair k
nvrp : Number of times port p is visited on route r
arp : Capacity allocated to agent at port p on route r (denoted as ap if |R| = 1)
~ap : The vector of allocated capacities on all the routes of agent at port p,





~a : The vector of allocated capacities of all agents,
where ~a = {~a1|~a2|...|~a|P |}
erp : Unit vector for agent p with number of entries = |Rp|,
entry of 1 for route r and 0 otherwise
yrk(~ap) : Number of demands accepted for O-D pair k on route r
when the agent at port p receives ~ap
yk : Number of demands accepted for O-D pair k
(defined for the special case of a single-route)
zpk : Binary decision variables that equal one if the entire demand of
O-D pair k ∈ ODp is satisfied and zero otherwise
Zp(~ap) : The objective function value of AP corresponding to the agent at port p






arp if (i, j) = (mr, t)
dk otherwise.
The decision variables, xij , ∀(i, j) ∈ Ap denote the flow on arc (i, j). APp is then
formulated as follows:










xji = bi, ∀i ∈ Np
0 ≤ xij ≤ uij .
The first set of constraints satisfies the flow balance restrictions, and the second set of
constraints corresponds to the individual flow bounds. The objective is to maximize the
total revenue from accepted demand. From the optimal solution of APp, we obtain yr∗k (~ap),
∀k ∈ ODp, ∀r ∈ RRk, using the following relation: yr∗k (~ap) = x∗(nk,mr).
Given the AP models, we present a mathematical formulation for CAP, where the

















The objective is to maximize the total revenue generated from the booking decisions of
all agents, while ensuring that the total accepted O-D pair demand on each leg is within
the capacity limits. We show in Lemma 1 that the multiple-route CAP is NP-hard, since a
special case of it is equivalent to the directed multi-commodity integral flow problem, which
is NP-hard (Garey and Johnson [29]). However, in general, CAP is not equivalent to a multi-
commodity flow problem, which assumes centralized control and does not incorporate the
behavior of the individual agents.
Lemma 1 The multiple-route CAP is NP-hard.
Proof. We consider the decision problem corresponding to the optimization problem
CAP. (CAP Decision Problem) INSTANCE: Given directed graph G = (N, A), capacity on
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each route, price and demand for each O-D pair and total revenue goal K. QUESTION: Is
there an assignment of route capacities to each agent, ~a = {~a1|~a2|...|~a|P |} where the capacity















yr∗k (~ap) ≤ capr, ∀r ∈ R, l ∈ Lr?
Restrict to directed multi-commodity integral flow by allowing instances where each
agent has demand for only one O-D pair. In this case, for each capacity allocation assigned
to an independent agent p (~ap), the solution of the APp, consisting of the accepted OD
pair and the corresponding revenue is known exactly. Thus the decision of finding the
set of capacity allocations becomes a question of how to send flow (or commodities) such
that revenue achieves a goal and capacities are not violated. (Note that directed multi-
commodity integral flow problem is a generalization of directed 2-commodity integral flow
problem, which is NP-complete, see Garey and Johnson [29]).
The multiple-route CAP problem incorporates agent behavior through the individual
AP solutions for each set of capacity allocation. Suppose instead, that one formulated an
integer program without the AP solutions, where the decision variables are the capacity
limits allocated to each agent and the number of demands accepted; constraints limit the
bookings on each leg by ship capacity and each agent’s bookings by his capacity allocation.
Although the capacity limits are added as decision variables, the solution of this program is
equivalent to the CP solution, and it does not model actual agent behavior in a decentralized
system. In the decentralized system, a different approach is needed to incorporate agent
behavior, ensure feasibility and maximize revenue. If the agent behavior can be explicitly
characterized, then it would be possible to solve CAP in one comprehensive model that
directly incorporates agent decisions. We show that this is possible for the special case of a
single-route.
An alternative allocation scheme to aggregate capacity allocation on each route is leg-
based allocation, where each agent receives separate capacity limits on each of the legs he can
use. In this case, the feasibility of CAP is easily ensured in an integer programming model.
In spite of this modelling convenience, a leg-based allocation scheme may not be appealing
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in practice for large systems. For instance, consider the size of a typical network for a sea
cargo carrier operating in Intra-Asia (e.g., [63]). The sales agent in Hong Kong is located
on a port that is serviced by 8 different routes. The sales agent would require 52 leg-based
capacity limits or 41 O-D pair-based capacity limits compared to 8 aggregate capacity limits
out of Hong Kong. Some sea cargo companies prefer the simplicity of assigning aggregate
capacity despite the inefficiencies that may result. Moreover, assigning aggregate capacity
limits rather than leg-based or O-D pair-based limits may be better as a planning tool since
aggregate forecasts of demand are more accurate than forecasted demand for each O-D pair.
The last problem that we model is CP, where the central headquarters and the sales
agents act as a single unit and jointly determine the best set of demands to accept in order
to maximize the overall system revenue. We formulate CP as an integer multi-commodity
flow problem following the representation in Ahuja et al. [1], where the commodities are
the O-D pairs in our setting.
We construct the underlying network G = (N,A), which includes the set of arcs (Ar)
and nodes (Pr) corresponding to each route r ∈ R, a source (nk) and a sink node (tk) for
each O-D pair k. In order to model no multiple loading/unloading of cargo, we replicate
the nodes in the routes which are visited more than once. We denote the resulting set of
nodes with P ′r. We denote the subgraphs for each O-D pair k with Gk = (Nk, Ak). We
summarize the arcs associated with each O-D pair k with Ok and Dk, where Ok is the set of
origin arcs, where Ok =
⋃
r∈RRk{(nk, j) : j ∈ P ′r,j = opk} and Dk is the set of destination
arcs, where Dk =
⋃
r∈RRk{(j, tk) : j ∈ P ′r,j = dpk}.
Then, G = (N,A), where
N = {(⋃r∈R P ′r) ∪ (
⋃
k∈OD nk) ∪ (
⋃
k∈OD tk)}
A = {(⋃r∈R Ar) ∪ (
⋃
k∈OD(nk, tk)) ∪ (
⋃
k∈OD O
k) ∪ (⋃k∈OD Dk)}.
For each k ∈ OD, Gk = (Nk, Ak), where
Nk = {(⋃r∈R{i ∈ P ′r : i is visited by O-D pair k}) ∪ nk ∪ tk}
Ak = {(⋃r∈R{(i, j) ∈ Ar : i, j ∈ Nk and (i, j) is traversed by O-D pair k }) ∪ (nk, tk) ∪
Ok ∪Dk}.
In Figure 2, we show an example network with two routes, which we use to construct
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the subgraph for the O-D pair with origin port 1 and destination port 7 in Figure 3. (The
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 Figure 3: Illustration of the subgraph constructed for O-D pair 1-7 in Figure 2
The problem parameters corresponding to the net supply at node i, (bi), the per unit






dk if i = nk













dk if (i, j) ∈ (Ok ∪Dk ∪ (nk, tk))
capr if (i, j) ∈
⋃
r∈R Ar.
The decision variables are xkij ,∀k ∈ OD,∀(i, j) ∈ Ak, denoting the flow of O-D pair k


















i , ∀k ∈ OD, ∀i ∈ Nk
∑
k∈OD
xkij ≤ uij , ∀(i, j) ∈ A
0 ≤ xkij ≤ dk, integer,∀(i, j) ∈ A, k ∈ OD
The first set of constraints satisfies the flow balance restrictions. The second set of
constraints corresponds to the bundle constraints that restrict the total flow of all O-D
pairs on each arc with the capacity of the arc. The last set of constraints are individual
flow bounds. The objective is to maximize the total revenue from accepted demand.
2.3 Solution Approaches
2.3.1 Special Case: Single Route
In this section, we analyze capacity allocation in a decentralized network with a single-route,
and we show several results using the special structure of CAP. These results also give us
insight into the multiple-route problem and could also apply to other transportation areas,
such as the railroad industry.
Similar to the analysis in Section 2.2, we first model the Single-route Agent Problem
(SAP) to understand the behavior of the agents. Given an agent p, we call the agent’s









yk ≤ ap, yk ≤ dk , ∀k ∈ ODp
}
.
The objective function is to maximize the revenue of the agent. The first set of con-
straints ensures that the total number of demands accepted is limited by the agent’s capacity
allocation. The second set of constraints restricts the number of accepted bookings for each
O-D pair by the corresponding demand. SAPp is equivalent to a continuous knapsack prob-
lem with integer data, which is optimized by a greedy algorithm that accepts the O-D pair
demands in the order of non-increasing prices. This characterization of the agents’ optimal
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solutions allows us to directly model agent behavior in the single-route case, which we incor-
porate in a mixed integer linear program for the Single-route Capacity Allocation Problem
(SCAP).
To formulate SCAP, we order the O-D pairs of each agent from highest to lowest in
prices, and we obtain the set ODp, ∀p ∈ P . We use an index l(k) to denote the order of
O-D pair k in ODp, where l(k) = 1 denotes the O-D pair k with the highest price, and
l(k) = |ODp| denotes the O-D pair k with the lowest price in ODp. (Since O-D pair k is
exclusively serviced by one agent, l(k) uniquely identifies each O-D pair k.) We use the
binary decision variables zpk (p ∈ P, k ∈ ODp) to incorporate the precedence relations among








yk ≤ cap for all l ∈ L,
dkz
p
k ≤ yk ≤ dk for all p∈P, k ∈ ODp : l(k)=1,
dkz
p
k ≤ yk ≤ dkzpk′ for all p∈P, k, k′∈ODp : l(k)= l(k′)+1, l(k)>1,
yk ≥ 0 for all k ∈ OD,
zpk = {0, 1} for all p ∈ P, k ∈ ODp.
The first set of constraints ensures that leg capacities are not exceeded. The second
set of constraints ensures that the demands accepted for the O-D pairs satisfy each agent’s
optimal behavior as characterized by the SAP solution. We calculate the capacity limits to
agent p from the solution of SCAP as ap =
∑
k∈ODp
yk, ∀p ∈ P .
Finally, we model the Single-route Central Problem (SCP) as an integer program with
a constraint matrix that has the circular 1’s property in its columns. (See Appendix A.1)
for the formulation.) This is best seen when the matrix is formed with rows denoting the
legs (in the order that they are traversed according to the sequence of ports) and columns
with O-D pairs. Then, the matrix has an entry of 1 when the leg is traversed by the O-D
pair in the corresponding column. For a definition of the circular 1’s property and results
on complexity status of related problems, see Hochbaum and Tucker [38]. Since SCP is
equivalent to SCAP without the precedence constraints, SCAP is at least as difficult as
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SCP, the complexity status of which is unknown to the best of our knowledge.
2.3.2 Heuristics for Multiple-Route CAP
As mentioned in Section 2.2, the multiple-route CAP is NP-hard. Therefore, we focus on
developing efficient heuristics that incorporate agent behavior.
2.3.2.1 Marginal Revenue (MR) Heuristic
In this section, we describe the Marginal Revenue (MR) heuristic to solve CAP. Given
current allocated capacities, we build a feasible solution by successively assigning fixed
increments of capacity to the agent that brings the highest current additional revenue (or
highest marginal revenue) without violating system feasibility. The latter is determined by
finding the capacity used on each leg considering bookings by all agents. Although designing
an allocation mechanism based on marginal revenue is a simple idea, the revenue can be
quite close to that of the optimal CAP solution. We summarize the main steps of the MR
heuristic below and provide a formal description of the algorithm in Appendix A.2.
1. Initialize the capacity limits to all agents at zero.
2. For each agent p on each route r ∈ Rp, temporarily increase the agent’s capacity limit
on route r by a stepsize and solve APp.
3. Find the agent and route pair (pmax, rmax) that brings the largest increase in the
objective function value and satisfies overall system feasibility.
4. Increase the capacity limits to agent pmax by stepsize.
5. Repeat Steps 2-4 while there exists an agent whose capacity limit can feasibly be
increased on a route.
The most time consuming part of the algorithm is finding (pmax, rmax), since this requires
solving multiple APs for each new capacity increment and checking the feasibility of the








. The use of a scalar, nvrp, is needed in order to capture the
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increased capacity resulting from multiple visitations to a port in a particular route. The
parameter stepsize, which is the size of the capacity increment in the allocation vector,
may be increased to reduce runtime, although this can result in a decrease in the solution
quality.
2.3.2.2 Priority O-D (POD) Based Allocation Heuristic
The Priority O-D (POD) based allocation heuristic is partly motivated by the single route
results in Section 2.3.1, where the optimal solution of AP is such that the agents satisfy
demands in a greedy fashion according to the ranked prices of the O-D pairs. Thus, for the
POD heuristic, we form OD by ordering the O-D pairs in the order of decreasing prices. We
allocate capacity to the agents according to this priority list, where allocation increments
are as large as possible without violating system feasibility. We summarize the main steps of
the POD heuristic below and provide a formal description of the algorithm in Appendix A.3.
1. Start with the O-D pair k that has the highest price and find a route r ∈ RRk that
may accommodate the largest amount of its demand.
2. Temporarily increase the allocation of the agent at the origin port of O-D pair k (opk)
on route r by the demand or the available capacity on that route, whichever is smaller.
3. Solve APopk . Make the agent’s allocation increment permanent if the new allocation
does not violate the system feasibility. Go to Step 5 if O-D pair k is entirely booked.
4. Continue with r ∈ RRk, r 6= r and repeat Steps 2 and 3.
5. Continue with the next O-D pair in OD until all O-D pairs have been considered or
no capacity is remaining.
An alternative we consider to giving priority to the routes with higher allowable space
(Step 1) is to solve the linear relaxation of CP and use the dual variables corresponding
to the legs of the routes for ranking the routes. Neither of the two approaches to route
selection is outperformed by the other in our computational experiments. The runtime of
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Figure 4: Example illustrating O-D pair replacement
the algorithm is directly proportional to the total number of O-D pairs. For each O-D pair
k, at most |RRk| number of minimum cost flow problems are solved.
While agent behavior is greedy and relatively easy to characterize in the single-route
problem, this is not true in the multiple-route case. There may be several types of behaviors
where the agent uses capacity differently than as estimated in the POD heuristic. In
Figure 4, we illustrate a situation, which we call “O-D pair replacement”, where the agent
may use the (temporarily) allocated capacity in his own self interest and may cause system
infeasibility. In this case, “O-D pair replacement” is performed by agent at port 5. Legs
(7, 6) and (6, 1) are totally occupied (represented by bold arcs with heavy lines), and the
prices of O-D pairs 5-1 and 5-7 are such that p5-1 > p5-7. Note that O-D pair 5-1 needs
space on (7, 6) and (6, 1), but O-D pair 5-7 does not. Consequently, the POD heuristic does
not allocate any capacity to the agent when considering O-D pair 5-1, but may attempt to
allocate him capacity for O-D pair 5-7 in order to improve the current solution. However,
the agent can use this capacity for O-D pair 5-1 since p5-1 > p5-7. This violates capacity
limits on legs (7, 6) and (6, 1). POD avoids future O-D replacements by agent 5 by not
allocating him more space on this route. In the case of “O-D pair replacement”, we can
identify the behavior and do not increase the agent’s capacity limit so that feasibility is
maintained.
Other kinds of agent behaviors may also occur, such as “O-D pair swapping”, where the
agent may swap routes used for previously considered O-D pairs and book an O-D pair with
higher price using the new capacity; thus causing system infeasibility. This behavior is more
difficult to characterize since it may result in multiple swaps of O-D pairs among routes.
Therefore, we ensure the feasibility of the overall solution by solving AP in Step 3 of the
heuristic. In this step, if we detect that the optimal AP solution causes system infeasibility,
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we do not assign the capacity increment permanently to the agent.
The POD heuristic assigns capacities to the sales agents based on estimated agent
behavior according to the priority list of O-D pairs. In contrast, the MR heuristic does
not make any assumptions about the structure of agent behavior and solves a new AP
to capture behavior for each potential capacity allocation. The POD heuristic allocates as
much capacity as possible at each iteration of the algorithm, while the MR heuristic allocates
fixed capacity increments determined by the stepsize. We show in our computational
experiments that the POD heuristic is much faster than the MR heuristic with a small
stepsize.
2.3.2.3 Benchmark Heuristics
We analyze two simple heuristics, Equal Allocation (EA) and Conservative Allocation (CA),
which are easy to implement and can be solved very quickly. In general, we do not expect
that these heuristics perform well for CAP, but they provide another benchmark against
which to compare the MR and POD heuristics. The EA heuristic equally distributes ship
capacity on a route among the agents that can book demand on the route. The CA heuristic
accounts for the O-D pair prices by solving a minimum cost flow problem, where the total
capacity allocated to all agents on a route is restricted by the ship capacity. In contrast,
the sum of the capacity limits in the optimal CAP solution may be greater than the ship
capacity based on the agents’ booking decisions.
The benchmark heuristics guarantee system feasibility independently of how the agents
solve their own problems, although this is achieved at the expense of revenues. The MR
and POD heuristics achieve higher revenues by incorporating how agents use their allocated
capacities, thus accommodating higher total demand; however, they require more extensive
effort to ensure overall feasibility.
2.3.3 Further Analysis of CAP
2.3.3.1 Alternative Agent Incentives
In all the models described so far, we assume that the agents maximize total revenue
generated by their O-D pair bookings. This corresponds with the incentives that sales
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agents currently receive in some sea cargo companies, i.e., a proportion of the total revenue
generated by their bookings. The total revenue incentive might be disadvantageous from a
system perspective when O-D pairs occupying a high number of legs bring higher revenue.
We propose an alternative sales incentive, which we call revenue per leg (rev/leg). Under the
rev/leg incentive, an agent receives revenue for an O-D pair based on the route he chooses
to transport that demand, where one unit of demand accepted for O-D pair k on a route r
improves the agent’s revenue by pk/|LLrk|. In particular, the formulation of APp is modified





−pk/|LLrk| ∀(i, j) = (nk,mr), ∀k ∈ ODp
0 otherwise.
Consequently, the agent’s objective is to maximize the sum of the revenues generated per
leg rather than the total revenue, while the central headquarters’ objective is to maximize
total system revenue under both incentives.
In our computational analysis we show that simply changing the agents’ objectives
in this way can be effective in moving the decentralized solution towards the centralized
solution. One reason for its effectiveness is the following. If an O-D pair traverses over a
large number of legs, then it typically shares capacity with a large number of other O-D
pairs. The rev/leg incentive essentially penalizes O-D pairs that use a large number of legs,
and therefore, a large amount of system capacity.
In some systems it is possible that the price to transport cargo already incorporates the
number of legs traversed between its origin and destination ports. In that case, another
incentive may be appropriate, such as revenue/container-mile if the price is not based
on the distance the cargo is transported. Other incentives that may be appropriate in
some situations include: i) the total number of demands booked by a sales agent ii) a
proportion of the total system revenue. The latter aligns agent’s revenue functions with
the centralized system, although it may be difficult to implement since the agents may not
have full knowledge of demand in other locations.
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2.3.3.2 Theoretical Results for CAP
In this section we investigate the performance of the optimal decentralized system under
the total revenue and rev/leg incentives. We show through examples that the optimal
revenue of the decentralized system may be asymptotically worse than that of the centralized
system. This is consistent with theoretical results on the price of anarchy in other kinds of
decentralized networks (Perakis [67]). This theoretical result also has practical implications
as it indicates that investment in a centralized system may be cost effective. One interesting
result is that when the decentralized system performed poorly under one incentive, the other
incentive led it to achieve the optimal CP solution.
Theorem 1 As the number of ports goes to infinity, the revenue obtained by the optimal
CAP solution with the total revenue incentive may be arbitrarily worse than the revenue
obtained by the optimal CP solution.
To show the theoretical inefficiency of CAP, we focus on the special case of the single
route, SCAP. We construct an example with a network of one simple cycle. That is, port
visitations are in the form of {1, 2, 3, .., n, 1}, where n (the number of ports)≥ 3. We present
the formal proof of this theorem and other key results of this chapter in Appendix A.4.
Remark 1 For the example in Theorem 1, the revenue obtained by the optimal SCAP
solution with the rev/leg incentive is the same as the revenue obtained by the optimal SCP
solution.
Remark 1 shows that the rev/leg incentive achieves the best performance for the decen-
tralized system in the example. Unfortunately, this incentive does not always give a good
decentralized system outcome. The following is a result on the worst case performance of
the rev/leg incentive.
Theorem 2 As the number of ports goes to infinity, the revenue obtained by the optimal
CAP solution with the rev/leg incentive may be arbitrarily worse than the revenue obtained
by the optimal CP solution.
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To prove Theorem 2, we construct another example with a similar network structure as
in Theorem 1, but with different prices for O-D pairs.
Remark 2 For the example in Theorem 2, the revenue obtained by the optimal SCAP
solution with the total revenue incentive is the same as the revenue obtained by the optimal
SCP solution.
Theorems 1 and 2 indicate that even if the decentralized system operates optimally, its
performance may be very poor compared to the optimal centralized system, i.e., the price
of anarchy may be high. Remarks 1 and 2 show that one incentive may perform better
than another in a particular system, therefore careful choice of incentives is important to
improve the decentralized system performance.
2.3.3.3 Upper Bound on Performance of CAP
Since we use heuristics to solve CAP for large problem sizes, additional analysis is needed
to evaluate the performance of the heuristics. This is particularly important when the
heuristics perform badly compared to CP ; in that case, it is not clear if the gap between
the heuristic solution and the CP solution is due to the nature of the heuristics or the
inefficiency of the decentralized system. In the following, we introduce an upper bound on
the performance of CAP that can be efficiently computed when it is not practical to solve
CAP optimally for large problem sizes.
We compute the upper bound by solving the independent APs for all agents where the
agents’ capacity limits are obtained from the accepted demands in the optimal CP solution.
Lemma 2 The procedure outlined in Steps 1-4 below provides an upper bound on CAP.
1. Solve CP and obtain the solution vectors of accepted demand out of each port.
2. For each agent on each route, sum the accepted O-D pair demand originating from
the agent’s port in the CP solution, and let this be the agent’s capacity allocation on
that route.
3. Solve APp, ∀p ∈ P , with the agents’ capacity limits as found in Step 2.
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4. Sum the objective function values (total revenue) of the APs to obtain the upper bound
on the optimal CAP revenue.
Given capacity limits from the CP solution, the agents can achieve a greater revenue
by accepting O-D pairs with higher prices since overall system feasibility is not required.
Thus, the total revenue generated by all agents is guaranteed to be at least as high as the
objective function value of the CP solution. We also know that the CP solution is an upper
bound on the CAP solution; therefore the result holds.
Introducing an upper bound for CAP that is weaker than the CP solution may seem
ineffectual. However, we motivate this strategy by noting that the performance gap between
the CAP and CP solutions may relate to the performance gap between the upper bound
and CP solutions. For example, we intuitively expect CAP to perform badly compared
to CP when the CP solution accepts many short O-D pairs but the agents prefer longer
O-D pairs with higher prices. In this case, to ensure feasibility the CAP solution assigns
relatively small capacity limits to the agents, thus resulting in significantly smaller revenue
than the CP solution. As a result, the revenue generated in the computation of the upper
bound is significantly greater than the CP solution, since the agents receive capacity limits
from the CP solution and they accept longer O-D pairs with higher prices.
Further, when capacity is very large relative to demand, both CAP and the upper
bound find the CP solution. We conjecture that the gap between the upper bound and
the CP solution is similar to the gap between the CP and CAP solutions. This is further
supported by our numerical experiments. Consequently, the upper bound may give insight
on the performance of the heuristics when the optimal CAP solution is not known.
2.4 Computational Experiments
The goals in our computational study are twofold. The first is to test the decentralized
system performance under different sales incentives in order to understand factors that
influence its performance relative to the centralized system. The second is to examine the
performance of our heuristics.
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2.4.1 Data Generation
The network characteristics in our computational study are intended to be similar to the
industry practice of sea cargo logistics companies. These carriers provide service throughout
the globe on trade lanes/routes (e.g., Trans-Pacific, Trans-Atlantic, Asia-North America,
Asia-Europe, and Intra-Asia.), where each route is further divided into sub-routes. For
example, OOCL’s Trans-Pacific service area includes 11 routes visiting a total of 29 different
ports, and all routes are non-simple cycles with approximately 25% of the ports being
revisited in the port sequence [64].
In data generation, we first specify the number of ports and the number of routes. Next,
we randomly assign the ports to the routes and determine a port rotation (or sequence)
within each route, allowing ports to be visited multiple times. We limit the number of
revisitations to 1/3 of the total number of ports.
The price of an O-D pair is a uniform random variable taking values between 0 and
2000, and the demand of an O-D pair is a uniform integer random variable taking values
between 0 and Maxdemand. In our experiments, we choose the values for Maxdemand as
30, 100 and 500. We calculate the ship capacity on a route as a fraction (Capacity/demand
ratio) of the total demand for the most highly requested leg on the route. We choose the
values of Capacity/demand ratio as 0.3, 0.5, and 0.8, representing low, medium and high
capacity levels. In the computational experiments, we generate 30 random instances and
average over the iterations. We conduct all computational experiments on a computer with
a 2.66 GHz Intel processor and 1 Gb of memory. We implement the formulations for the
APs and CP using ILOG’s OPT Studio 3.7, and we use the callable component library
feature (C++ API) to access ILOG’s CPLEX 9.0 solver when solving CAP.
2.4.2 Enumerative Method
The optimal solution of CAP can be found by an enumerative algorithm that checks all
possible combinations of capacity limits for agents to find the set with the highest system
revenue. However, such an algorithm is impractical for reasonable problem sizes since
the number of possible combinations is very large. In an instance with |P | = 10, |R| =
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(capr · nvrp)) = 1060. Thus, to evaluate the heuristics, we solve the CAP to
optimality for small instances. The optimal CAP solution also gives us insight on the
performance of the upper bound that we introduced in Section 2.3.3.3, which we calculate
for all problems.
Note that for a given vector of allocated capacities, there may exist alternative optimal
solutions of APs. In such cases, system feasibility may be violated if the agents use capacity
differently than predicted. The solution methods that we propose for CAP are guaranteed
to contain a set of optimal AP solutions that constitutes a system feasible solution. In cases
where the optimal AP solution can uniquely be found, system feasibility is always ensured.
In practice, this can be achieved by the use of an optimization software throughout the
company that has the same deterministic solver engine [39]. Perturbing the O-D pair prices
such that it is less likely for multiple combinations of O-D pairs to have the same revenue
can also be effective in alleviating the existence of alternative optimal solutions.
2.4.3 Experimental Results
In Figure 5, we show the upper bound and the performance of various solution methods
for CAP as a percentage of the optimal CP revenue. In Figure 5(a), which is based on
small-sized instances, we see that both the optimal and heuristic decentralized system so-
lutions are able to achieve at least 88% of the optimal CP revenue. In the worst case,
the heuristics achieve 98% of their respective optimal decentralized system revenues in the
CAP solution. The upper bound also has a similar performance to that of the decentralized
optimal solution, performing the worst when capacity is tight.
In Figure 5(b), we analyze the performance of heuristics using larger-sized instances.
As expected, the MR and POD heuristics perform significantly better than the benchmark
heuristics. For example, the former achieve 80% of the centralized revenue under the tightest
capacity, while the latter attain no more than 43% in that case. Therefore, it is valuable
to improve performance by explicitly solving APs as in the MR and POD heuristics. The
MR heuristic with rev/leg incentive has the best performance of the heuristics (within 5%
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of the optimal CP revenue). For the large problems, the upper bound may be used as a
proxy for the performance of the decentralized optimal solution; note that the gap between
the upper bound and the optimal CP revenue as a function of capacity is about the same
in both graphs.
One observation that is common to Figures 5(a) and 5(b) is that the performance of
all heuristic solutions improves relative to the optimal CP solution with an increasing
Capacity/demand ratio. We can explain this observation as follows. As capacity becomes
tight compared to demand, the revenue loss for not accepting the most profitable demands
is more important since any loss may have a significant impact.
In Figure 6, we show examples on additional networks with different sizes. Note that,
the upper bound and the optimal CAP solution behave similarly relative to the optimal
CP solution, which is consistent with our conjecture in Section 2.3.3.3.
Two performance measures that are of interest to the cargo carriers are the service levels
of the system and the utilizations of the ships. We calculate the service level for each agent
as the ratio of total demand accepted by the agent to the total demand out of the agent’s
home port. In Figure 7(a), we depict the average service levels across all agents as a function
of Capacity/demand ratio. One interesting observation is that the MR heuristic solution
with the rev/leg incentive achieves higher service levels than the optimal CP solution. The
ship utilization on each route is equal to the average leg occupancy, which is defined as
the ratio of total flow on a leg to the route capacity. In Figure 7(b), we show the ship
utilizations averaged over all routes. We see that ship utilizations are significantly higher in
the optimal CP solutions compared to the MR heuristics because the CP solution is able
to use the ship capacities more efficiently without considering agent behavior.
The average runtimes of the algorithms for the decentralized system are given in Table 2
for the instances corresponding to Figure 5. In Table 2(a), which shows the small networks,
the runtimes of all algorithms increase as the Capacity/demand ratio increases. As we
expect, the enumerative algorithm that finds the optimal CAP solution increases at a much
faster rate than the runtimes of the heuristics. Table 2(b) shows the average runtimes of the
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Figure 5: Decentralized system performance with increasing Capacity/demand ratio
30
Table 2: Runtimes of the algorithms in CPU seconds
(a) #Routes = 2, #Ports = 6,Maxdemand = 30
Capacity/demand ratio
0.3 0.5 0.8
CAP Optimal (total revenue) 7.04 50.59 509.49
CAP Optimal (rev/leg) 7.07 51.92 540.47
MR (total revenue)∗ 1.23 2.04 3.19
MR (rev/leg) 1.39 2.25 3.28
POD 0.12 0.14 0.17
(b) #Routes = 5, #Ports = 10,Maxdemand = 500
Capacity/demand ratio
0.3 0.5 0.8
MR (total revenue) 204.18 326.44 489.75
MR (rev/leg) 309.38 434.14 588.87
POD 0.65 0.81 0.95
∗stepsize = 1 for the MR heuristic
real-time, these runtimes are reasonable. Also note that the runtime of the POD heuristic
is significantly smaller than the MR heuristic, while its performance in these instances is
at most 10% worse than the latter. We may reduce the runtimes of the MR heuristics
by choosing larger stepsize values, although note that this can decrease the quality of the
solution. In the instances with medium capacity in Table 2(b), the MR heuristic with the
total revenue incentive achieves 93% of the centralized optimal revenue with a stepsize of
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Figure 7: Average service level and ship utilization with increasing Capacity/demand
ratio
2.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we study a Principal-Agent problem on a network motivated by practices
in some sea cargo companies. In such companies, the central headquarters, acting as the
principal, assigns capacity limits and incentives to sales agents, and the sales agents indi-
vidually book O-D pair demands originating from their home port. This is an example of
a system that operates in a decentralized fashion, and it is sometimes less efficient than
a centralized system where all decisions are made by a central organizing body. However,
decentralized systems are desirable when centralization requires high investment and op-
erating costs. Our research focuses on managing the decentralized system efficiently by
developing optimization tools to determine the capacity limits and incentives for the sales
agents.
We formulate a capacity allocation problem for the central headquarters that determines
the capacity limits by explicitly incorporating agent behavior with network flow models. For
the special case of the single route, we show that the optimal agent behavior can be included
in a mixed integer program for the capacity allocation problem. In the general case of the
multiple-route, we show that the capacity allocation problem is NP-hard, and we develop
several heuristics that integrate agent behavior. We show an asymptotic result that the
decentralized system performance can be arbitrarily worse than the centralized system per-
formance. On the other hand, for more typical networks, we use computational experiments
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to show that the decentralized system performance can be close to the centralized system
performance, and its performance improves as capacity increases. We further show that the
choice of sales incentive is a factor that can improve the performance of the decentralized
system. Our models can be useful in rough-cut capacity planning and for the managers to
evaluate “what-if” scenarios.
There are several limitations to our work. First, we do not explicitly model the agents’
decisions in choosing sales effort. Therefore, the models are expected to be useful when the
effect of incentives on effort levels is limited. Next, we do not include competition among
agents or sea cargo companies. We also study a deterministic system as a first step towards
studying the more complex real system that is stochastic and dynamic.
Our work develops optimization models to manage a system with individual decision
makers. Analyzing decentralized decision-making is important since there are many sys-
tems in practice that operate in a decentralized manner, and most optimization models in
literature assume a centralized planner. It would be interesting to extend this research by
modelling the decentralized booking system in a stochastic setting, where capacity can be
re-allocated to the sales agents as demand bookings are realized.
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CHAPTER III
SALES PROMOTIONS IN A DECENTRALIZED SUPPLY CHAIN
3.1 Introduction
Much of supply chain management focuses on matching supply and demand through various
means such as production flexibility, lead-time management, and channel coordination.
In recent years, there has also been a particular focus on manipulating demand through
the use of dynamic pricing or promotions to achieve higher profits, e.g., Elmaghraby and
Keskinocak [26], Kim et al. [47], and Tang and Tang [76]. This is especially true in
industries such as automotive and airlines, where capacity is difficult and costly to adjust.
Our goal is to determine under what market conditions (such as demand uncertainty in
market potential and price sensitivity) offering customer rebates versus retailer incentives
or combined promotions are more profitable or lead to higher sales for the manufacturer.
This problem lies at the interface of marketing and operations management.
The main motivation for our research comes from the practices in the auto industry
and our discussions with a major auto manufacturer. The production and labor costs of
the American auto manufacturers are nearly fixed in part due to union costs, and hence,
they focus on increasing revenues, e.g., through the use of promotions. Jakobson [41] states
that “Detroit’s costs are roughly the same whether a plant is churning out as many cars
as it can or standing idle part of the time - so the Big Three produce more cars than their
market share justifies, creating gluts that force them to offer large cash incentives to move
the excess.” Busse et al. [15] mention the auto manufacturers’ rigid pricing strategy and
state that “Although retail demand for an automobile fluctuates due to changing economic
conditions, seasonality, and the stage of the model’s life cycle, manufacturers rarely vary
published retail and invoice prices of a particular model over the course of the model year.”
The authors also mention that the auto manufacturers use the “incentive promotions” as
an important market strategy tool to respond to fluctuating demand conditions.
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Promotions have been frequently used by manufacturers in different industries as a
means to increase sales, revenues and market share against competitors by increasing con-
sumers’ awareness about their brand, to reduce the inventories of the slow-moving items, or
to price discriminate. In the auto industry, different promotional programs such as customer
rebate, low percent financing, and employee pricing programs, are offered. In addition to
these direct-to-customer promotions, auto manufacturers sometimes offer incentives to the
retailers that are generally not publicized to the end customers. Retailer incentives may
encourage the dealers to advertise or negotiate with their customers to generate more sales.
As stated by Priddle and Zoia [68], promotions in the auto industry date back to 1912
with rebates offered by Henry Ford on Model Ts. Other developments include the intro-
duction of Chrysler’s rebate program (1975) and General Motors’ 0% financing program
(2001). Automobile manufacturers offered $56 billion in incentives to sell 16.6 million cars
and trucks in 2003 (Smith [71]) and the average rebate per model offered by the American
auto manufacturers was more than triple that of the Japanese auto manufacturers in 2004
(Henderson [37]). In fact, the American auto manufacturers are known to use frequent and
deep customer rebates or cashback, whereas the non-Americans, especially, Japanese, are
more inclined to offer incentives to their dealers. Figure 8, based on data sets provided by
R. L. Polk & Co. and a major market research firm, shows that the rebate percentages used
by the American auto manufacturers are higher and show an increasing trend compared to
the Japanese auto manufacturers who offer steadily lower rebates. The promotional choice
may depend on the demand characteristics faced by the manufacturers.
It is essential to know which promotion provides higher sales and profits under what
kind of market conditions. In this paper, we examine these questions by focusing on two
different promotions, namely, the retailer incentive and the customer rebate. In the former,
the manufacturer offers a (lump-sum) incentive to the retailer which can be used in a flexible
way by the dealer; in the latter, the manufacturer offers a per-unit customer rebate directly
to the end customers. Dealer incentives are offered in different forms by manufacturers, e.g.,
as lump-sum or per-unit incentive for each vehicle sold. Referring to lump-sum incentives
Edmunds.com president Jeremy Anwyl states “here is $100,000 for the dealer to use as he
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Figure 8: Total registrations and average rebate percentages of midsize models
sees fit” (Anwyl [4]). By contrast, in per-unit incentive scheme, the dealer usually receives
a higher payment for each additional vehicle sold beyond a quota set by the manufacturer.
The basic tradeoff is that customer rebates are given to every customer, while the retailer
controls the use of the retailer incentive and decides how much to give to each customer.
While customer rebates are widely publicized, dealer incentives are not. The retailers can
also offer their own promotions mostly in the form of customer rebates, but these are
generally offered locally and at smaller amounts; thus they are outside the scope of our
study.
This chapter is organized as follows. We provide a literature review in Section 3.2, fol-
lowed by our models, their analysis and comparisons in Section 3.3. We state our conclusions
in Section 3.4.
3.2 Literature Review
Several articles on promotions focus on their role as a price discriminating tool, considering
single or multiple firms selling directly to the end customers with no intermediary in be-
tween. (e.g., see Bester and Petrakis [8], Gerstner and Holthausen [34], Narasimhan [60].)
Gerstner and Hess [31] introduce channel issues by analyzing different types of promotions
(trade deals and rebates) in a single manufacturer and single retailer setting, where the
market has two customer segments with high and low reservation prices. They find that
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even when all consumers exercise their rebates and price discrimination does not occur, the
manufacturers may still find it profitable to offer rebates. Gerstner et al. [33] extend their
research by allowing competition between the retailers but only analyze customer rebates.
The retailer pass through rate (the percentage of a trade promotion passed through to
consumers) and forward buying (or stockpiling) are two issues stemming from the use of
promotions directed towards retailers. Tyagi [81] focuses on temporary price cuts given by
the manufacturer to retailers and shows conditions on the market demand function that
determines the retailer’s pass-through rate. Lal et al. [51] analyze the motivations for
manufacturers to offer promotions when the retailers forward buy and do not pass the price
discounts to the customers. Kim and Staelin [48] analyze manufacturer allowances (similar
to our lump-sum incentives) and retailer pass-through rates in a supply chain with two
manufacturers selling through two non-exclusive retailers. In their model, the lump-sum
payments are used by the retailers as price discounts for each unit of sales. They find that the
manufacturers give retailers side payments (allowances) even though they know the retailers
will pocket some portion of it. This finding is mainly a result of the competition among
the manufacturers. Side payments that are offered by manufacturers to promote their new
product introductions and to convince the retailers to carry their products are called slotting
allowances. Lariviere and Padmanabhan [53] analyze slotting allowances to promote new
product sales where the manufacturer has private information about demand. The authors
show that slotting allowances are only offered if the retailer faces a high opportunity cost
of stocking the product. Desai [24] compares slotting allowance and advertising efforts of
a manufacturer to promote new product sales, where the retailer faces uncertain demand.
The author shows that slotting allowances help the manufacturer more when the market is
highly competitive and the retailers have high stocking costs.
In recent years, there have been some extensions within the framework of supply chains
analyzing sales promotions as a tool for channel coordination including Gerstner and Hess
[32], Krishnan et al. [50], and Taylor [77]. Chen et al. [17] and Aydin and Porteus [6] analyze
the effects of rebates on the manufacturer’s and retailer’s profits in a 2-stage supply chain
with stochastic demand. Chen et al. [17] show that rebates always benefit the manufacturer
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unless all of the buyers redeem their rebates; otherwise they do not necessarily increase the
manufacturer’s profits. Aydin and Porteus [6] compare per-unit retailer rebate and per-
unit customer rebate. The authors conclude that neither the manufacturer nor the retailer
always prefers one particular rebate to the other. Sohoni et al. [72] analyze the effects of
dealer incentives on sales variability and show that manufacturers may increase profits and
decrease sales variability by offering an appropriate stair-step dealer incentive when their
dealer is exclusive.
Motivated by practices in the auto industry, our work differs from the cited articles
in that the retailer can price discriminate rather than choose a fixed retail price for all
customers, which we believe captures the nature of sales by the auto dealers. We analyze
retailer incentives that are in the form of lump-sum amounts rather than a wholesale price
deduction, motivated by the practices of auto manufacturers who generally keep wholesale
prices constant for the model year and offer periodic incentives to the dealers.
Bruce et al. [12, 13] analyze trade promotions (wholesale discounts after a sales quan-
tity target) and cash rebates in the durable goods market, such as automobile, by explicitly
incorporating a durability measure for the manufacturer’s products to focus on the intertem-
poral effects of the promotions. In the former research, the authors find in a competitive
setting that the manufacturer of the more durable product benefits more from trade pro-
motions. In the latter research, they analyze cash rebates in a single manufacturer and
single retailer setting similar to ours. They find that as the durability of the manufacturer’s
products decreases, the manufacturer finds it more profitable to offer deeper cash rebates.
Our research differs from [12, 13] in several aspects. We focus on the effect of demand
uncertainty on the manufacturer’s choice of promotions, while they focus on the durability
of the manufacturers’ products. In their analysis, the wholesale price of the manufacturer
is contracted simultaneously with the promotions in a deterministic setting, while we allow
the wholesale price to be determined under uncertainty. Further, our work focuses on com-
paring the performances of the customer rebates and retailer incentives in the same model
setting where the retailer can price discriminate.
There is a large body of empirical research investigating how promotions work, focusing
38
mostly on non-durables. See Blattberg et al. [10] for a review. Some empirical analysis in
durables, such as automobiles includes Busse et al. [15] and Pauwels et al. [66].
In our research, we focus mainly on the manufacturer’s wholesale price and promotion
decisions and their impact on profits and sales in a decentralized decision framework where
the retailer chooses the sales price (for each customer) and the sales quantity. We also
contribute to the economics literature by analyzing first-degree (perfect) price discrimina-
tion, where different prices may be given to every customer rather than just to segments of
customers, which has received little attention by researchers. To the best of our knowledge,
Spulber [74] and White and Walker [84] are only two that analyze perfect price discrimina-
tion in detail. Spulber [74] analyzes a model where a group of firms that do perfect price
discrimination select their output levels simultaneously. The author shows the existence
of a unique non-cooperative equilibrium in output levels. In this analysis the firms sell di-
rectly to the end customers and no sales promotions are considered. White and Walker [84]
analyze the case where there is a variable cost associated with perfect price discrimination.
The authors propose a model where perfect price discrimination is selectively practiced only
on one portion of the linear demand function, and they show that their model generates
higher profits compared to the perfect price discrimination practiced on the entire demand
function. Their setting is simplistic, and they analyze only one firm’s sales quantity deci-
sion, where the firm sells directly to the end customers, while we analyze sales quantity and
promotional decisions in two-stage supply chains.
3.3 Models
We consider a two-stage supply chain with a single manufacturer and a single retailer,
operating in a market where demand is characterized by a linear inverse demand function,
i.e., P (Q) = a− bQ, where a is the market potential, b is the price sensitivity and P (Q) is
the price when Q units of the product are sold. (Note that ab is the maximum quantity that
may be sold when the price is zero. Since we are interested in changing a while keeping b
fixed, we denote a as the market potential for the rest of the paper.) The retailer (or dealer)
buys from the manufacturer at a unit wholesale price denoted by w, and has a reservation
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price, w + m, below which he would not be willing to sell. We assume that the retailer
can do perfect (first degree) price discrimination. While perfect price discrimination by the
retailer can be costly, we do not expect this cost to differ significantly from one customer to
another even when the customers differ in terms of their willingness to pay. Therefore, we
assume that the cost of price discrimination is constant for each unit of sale. This allows
us to absorb the price discrimination cost as part of the retailer’s reservation price.
Our setting is applicable to channels where the retailer is a franchisee selling one man-
ufacturer’s products exclusively, e.g., the auto industry. Linear demand models have been
used by major auto manufacturers in practice, e.g., Biller et al. [9]. In the auto industry,
manufacturers usually commit to a constant wholesale price. (Cachon and Lariviere [16]
mention that manufacturers hold wholesale prices constant even when capacity is scarce.)
Our model mimics the practice, where a retailer’s reservation price may depend on the car
invoice price (Scott Morton et al. [69], and Zettelmeyer et al. [86]). In our setting, the
reservation price of the retailer may be compensated by a combination of the sales price
(which should be at least w+m if there is no incentive) and the lump-sum incentive offered
by the manufacturer.
The auto dealers have the opportunity to negotiate individually with each customer
and collect information about the customer’s willingness to pay. Zettelmeyer et al. [85]
mention price discrimination as one reason for the retailers to negotiate the prices and
state that “Given the high price of a new car, it would not be surprising if the cost of
gaining information about a customer’s willingness to pay is, in comparison, small enough
to make the dealer’s effort to assess a customer’s valuation and negotiate individual prices
more profitable than posting a fixed price.” Goldberg [36] empirically finds that dealers can
achieve price discrimination through the car model, market-specific properties, and the type
of purchase transaction such as first-time purchase and trade-in. Scott Morton et al. [70]
add that individual characteristics of car buyers, such as income, education, and search
costs are significant factors that affect the dealers’ pricing of the cars. Price discrimination
through negotiations may also be observed during purchases and sales of houses or other
less expensive products through bidding over the internet.
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We assume that the manufacturer has ample capacity, and there is no cost to customers
associated with rebate redemptions. Since we are interested in comparing the performances
of different promotions, we also assume that the administrative cost of offering promotions
is zero. We analyze a single selling season; this can be thought of as snapshot in time
of a repeated process. Finally, we assume that the manufacturer and the retailer are risk
neutral, and both seek to maximize their own (expected) profits.
Table 3 summarizes our notation. Note that the manufacturer cannot make positive
profits unless she sells above cost, therefore she chooses w ≥ c. By the retailer’s reservation
price, P (0) ≥ w + m must hold, which together with w ≥ c, implies that a ≥ c + m.
Table 3: Notation for Chapter 3
aj : Market potential in demand state j = l, h (l =low, h =high)
bj : Price sensitivity of customers in demand state j = l, h
Qji : Retailer’s order/sales quantity in demand state j = l, h
when promotion type i ∈ (o, I, R, R′, C) is used (o =no promotion,
I =retailer incentive, R =customer rebate,
R′ =customer rebate leading to market expansion, C =combined)
P (Q) : Retail price when Q units are sold
ΠMji : Profit of the manufacturer under promotion i in demand state j
(ΠMi when demand is deterministic)
ΠDji : Profit of the retailer under promotion i in demand state j
when manufacturer makes her w decision under uncertainty
(ΠDi when demand is deterministic)
ΠSCi : Profit of the supply chain under promotion i
c : Production cost of the manufacturer
wi : Wholesale price under promotion type i
wi + m : Reservation price of the retailer under promotion i
Kj : Lump-sum incentive given to the retailer in demand state j
Rj : Per unit customer rebate in demand state j
We analyze three demand settings. In Section 3.3.1, we present a deterministic model
where there is no uncertainty in the system parameters. (Deterministic demand models have
been commonly used in the literature to provide insights and for analytical tractability; see
for example, Choi [18] and Corbett and Karmarkar [21].) In Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3,
we introduce uncertainty (“high” with probability β and “low” with probability 1 − β)
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Figure 9: Demand functions for uncertain market settings
respectively. This type of uncertainty could correspond to scenario planning as is used by
many manufacturers in strategic level decisions. In Figure 9, we plot the demand functions
corresponding to uncertain market potential and uncertain price sensitivity. Introducing
uncertainty has the effect of an up or down shift in the demand function or a change in its
slope.
We formulate all models as Stackelberg games, where the manufacturer is the leader and
the retailer is the follower. We use backward induction to find the subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium (SPNE). We find the optimal decisions for the manufacturer and the retailer
for each model and compare the promotions based on the manufacturer’s profit and total
sales. We also analyze the profits of the retailer and the supply chain, but our focus is on
the manufacturer’s choice of promotions. Our goal is to determine situations under which
one promotion type is better than another for the manufacturer.
3.3.1 Deterministic Demand Model
In this benchmark setting, demand is deterministic and is common knowledge to both
the manufacturer and the retailer. The sequence of decisions starts with the manufacturer
determining the wholesale price. Given the manufacturer’s decision, the retailer then decides
the order/sales quantity.
When the manufacturer offers customer rebate or retailer incentive, Figure 10 describes
how we would expect these promotions to affect the retailer’s decisions. In the case of
no promotion, the retailer has no incentive to sell at a price less than w + m, where the




)+. The manufacturer’s purpose in
offering promotions is to induce the retailer to order more than Qo. If she offers customers
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Figure 10: The impact of retailer incentives and customer rebates on the retailer’s decisions
under deterministic demand
a per-unit rebate of R applied to each buyer’s price, this has the effect of shifting the demand
function up, i.e., P (Q)−R = a−bQ or P (Q) = (a+R)−bQ so that the y-axis is intersected
at a+R (Figure 10(a)). The total amount of rebate given to the end customers is the area of
ABCD. On the other hand, if the manufacturer offers a lump-sum incentive to the retailer,
this will have no effect on the shape of the demand function since end customers are not
made aware of this incentive, but will make the retailer move downward on the demand
function from E down to G as long as he receives the reservation price from the sales of
each additional unit (Figure 10(b)). In this case, the triangular area EFG represents the
total amount of the lump-sum incentive the retailer is going to use to increase sales, while
his reservation price is compensated by this incentive.
Case 0: (No-promotion) The retailer solves the problem in (P1) to decide how much
to order/sell to maximize his profit given the wholesale price decision of the manufacturer,




)+ where (x)+ = max{0, x}. Note that, for the retailer to
satisfy his reservation price, P (Q) = a− bQ ≥ w + m, i.e., Q ≤ a−w−mb .




(a− bQ)dQ− wQ = (a− w)Q− bQ
2
2
s.t. Q ≤ a− w −m
b
The manufacturer’s problem is to choose the optimal wholesale price that maximizes
her profit, i.e., max
w≥c
(w − c)Qo.
Case 1: (Retailer incentive) The manufacturer offers an incentive (K) to the retailer.
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In this case, the retailer chooses his order/sales quantity (QI) by solving the problem in
(P2), and the manufacturer determines the wholesale price and incentive value simultane-
ously by solving max
K≥0,w≥c
(w − c)QI −K.










((w + m)− (a− bQ))dQ ≤ K
Note that, given the manufacturer’s decisions, (w,K), the retailer has the option of
not transferring the incentive to the end customers and choosing QI = a−w−mb , where he
pockets all of K, and the price of the last unit sold is equal to his reservation price. However,





greater than a−w−mb , i.e., there is potential for the retailer to further increase his profits if
he agrees to sell some additional units below his reservation price. On the other hand, to sell
additional units beyond Q = a−w−mb and still make his reservation price w +m, the retailer
must be compensated by the lump-sum incentive, which is ensured by the constraint. In
other words, being the first decision maker in this game, the manufacturer has the advantage
of choosing (w, K) to make the retailer voluntarily transfer some part of the incentive to
the end customers and increase sales. We also note that while any K ≥ 0 increases the




, after which the retailer starts
to pocket the incentive. In equilibrium, the manufacturer finds the optimal incentive value
such that incentive is completely passed to the end customers and no pocketing occurs.
This model captures a dealer behavior observed in practice, where the auto dealers transfer
some part of the manufacturers’ incentives to the end users. This is investigated by Busse
et al. [15] among others. The turn-and-earn system for inventory allocation, and the fact
that dealers who sell a high volume may receive a better selection of vehicles, e.g., vehicles
with higher profit margin in the future, also motivate this behavior.
Case 2: (Customer rebate) The manufacturer gives the end customers a rebate, R,
for each unit purchased. Therefore, the purchasing power of the customers increases by R
and the inverse demand function is written as: P (Q) = a + R− bQ. The retailer’s and the
manufacturer’s problems are similar to the no-promotion case, where the retailer determines
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Table 4: The SPNE for the deterministic demand model with retailer incentive



























order/sales quantity, and the manufacturer determines the rebate R and the wholesale price
w that maximize their own profits.
Theorem 3 When demand is deterministic, the SPNE corresponding to the cases where
the manufacturer offers no promotion, a lump-sum amount of incentive to the retailer, and
a per-unit rebate to the end customers are summarized as follows:














(ii) Retailer incentive: see Table 4.











We present the proof of this theorem and other key results of this chapter in Ap-
pendix B.1.
In Theorem 3(iii), we find wR−R = a+c−m2 in equilibrium. Since for any given wholesale
price we can find another wholesale price and rebate pair (w, R) resulting in the same
profits, this is equivalent to the optimal wholesale price decision for the no-promotion case.
Moreover, the manufacturer’s sales and profit do not improve with the customer rebate
promotion. Bruce et al. [13] find a similar relation between w∗ and R∗, and show that the
manufacturer does not always find it profitable to give customer rebates, especially when
the administrative cost of rebate promotion is high. In our analysis, as a special case of
their model, the cost of rebates to the manufacturer is zero. The ineffectiveness of the
customer rebates in our setting is mainly a result of the retailer’s ability of perfect price
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discrimination which allows him to capture all the market surplus when the manufacturer
offers rebates directly to the end customers.
In our basic model, the effect of the rebates is limited by an additive function of the cash-
back amount, i.e., the market potential increases to a + R. However, in practice, rebates
may cause an additional increase in the market potential (market expansion) since they
are often advertised by the manufacturers and/or the retailers, which increase customer
awareness. For example, in the auto industry both the dealers and the auto manufacturers
use the newspapers and broadcasting for advertising. Since it is costly to advertise these
promotions, it is essential that the manufacturer finds the correct balance between the cost
of promoting and the revenue from the additional sales. We model this situation with a
market expansion factor (α) affecting market potential, and an advertising cost that is a
convex increasing function of this expansion factor (eα2). We observe that when rebates
lead to market expansion, neither of the promotions is always preferred to another by the
manufacturer. We present the complete analysis in Appendix B.2.
Using the results in Theorem 3, we compare the retailer incentive and the customer
rebate promotions with respect to two measures that might be of interest to the manufac-
turer, namely, total profit and quantity sold. The latter is related with the market share,
which is a particularly important measure in the auto industry. Although we focus on the
manufacturer’s promotional decisions, we also compare the retailer’s and the supply chain’s
profits under different promotions to better understand their impact on the entire chain.
Observation 1 When rebates do not lead to market expansion (i) offering customer rebates
is not effective in increasing the quantity sold and does not change the manufacturer’s or
retailer’s profits (ii) the retailer incentive is always better than the customer rebate and no
promotion in terms of total sales, the manufacturer’s profit, and the supply chain’s profit,
but not necessarily the retailer’s profit.
Observation 1(i) holds because when rebates do not lead to market expansion, for any
(w,R) combination, the manufacturer can choose a wholesale price w −R ≥ 0 and achieve
the same results as in no promotion. Observation 1(ii) is driven by the tradeoff in using
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the promotion for every buyer (customer rebate) versus only for those who need it (retailer
incentive), as well as the retailer’s reservation price. Recall that, the retailer is not willing
to sell below his reservation price (w + m). By using the incentive to cover the difference
between the price that the customer pays and his reservation price (only for those customers
who cannot afford to pay his reservation price), the retailer is able to generate more sales
than the no-promotion case. Although the manufacturer obtains higher profits with higher
sales, the retailer’s profit does not always increase. For example, if the market potential
is already high (a ≥ 3.5m + c), when the manufacturer offers an incentive, she raises her
wholesale price at the same time, which in turn results in higher sales but lower profits
for the retailer. (Bruce et al. [13] make a similar observation regarding customer rebate,
i.e., the manufacturer offering a cash rebate increases her wholesale price more than the
rebate amount. Bruce et al. [12] analyze trade promotions with two manufacturers and two
retailers, and find that each retailer makes less profit when both manufacturers offer trade
promotions.) A modelling alternative is based on principal-agent framework, where the
manufacturer chooses the wholesale price and the retailer incentive such that the retailer’s
profit with the incentive is at least as high as his profit with no promotion. We present
the analysis of this model in Appendix B.3 and show that our qualitative insights are the
same as those in Observation 1. This model may have limited applicability in the auto
industry where the retailers do not have the flexibility to accept or reject each contract
in the case of promotions. Moreover, a dealer generally has a long-standing relationship
with the manufacturer, and a dealership does not easily switch from one manufacturer to
another.
The retailer’s reservation price can be related to his operational costs. However, if we
treat m only as a cost incurred for every unit sold, in the retailer incentive case, the entire
K is pocketed by the retailer, and therefore, the manufacturer does not offer any incentive.
As a result, the customer rebate and retailer incentive cases become identical to the no-
promotion case. Assuming the retailer’s reservation price is similar to what we observe for
customer behavior (willing to buy if price is below reservation price), as also mentioned in
several other studies in the automobile industry (Scott Morton et al. [69], and Zettelmeyer
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et al. [86]), we assume that the reservation price of the retailer does not only correspond to
an operational cost per-unit sold, but rather it is the lowest acceptable price for each unit
that the retailer is willing to sell.
We analyze the manufacturer’s promotional decisions in three other cases: 1) the retailer
sets a fixed retail price rather than price discriminating, 2) the retailer incentive is a per-unit
payment rather than a lump-sum amount, 3) the retailer has a specific pass-through rate
when offered an incentive. We present the analysis of each case in Appendices B.4, B.5, and
B.6, respectively. In the first case, we find that the manufacturer is always better off with the
retailer incentive than the customer rebate in terms of profit, but not necessarily in terms
of sales, which is different than our result for the price discrimination case. This also shows
the importance of modelling price discrimination since increased sales with incentives are
observed in the auto industry. In the second case, we find that the manufacturer is always
better off with a per-unit retailer incentive than a customer rebate (just as we found for
lump-sum incentive.) Moreover, when a ≥ 3m + c, the manufacturer’s profit is higher with
a per-unit incentive than a lump-sum incentive. Therefore, we expect that our insights
with lump-sum incentive would hold even more strongly for other incentive schemes that
depend on quantity. Finally, in the third case, we find that our qualitative results in the
comparison of promotions do not change, i.e., the manufacturer is better off with a retailer
incentive than a customer rebate as long as the pass-through rate is not zero; otherwise,
the manufacturer would not offer any incentive.
By Observation 1, we conclude that when the manufacturer and the retailer have the
same (and accurate) information about the market conditions and when rebates do not lead
to market expansion, the manufacturer always prefers the retailer incentive over customer
rebate. If this is the case, then why do the manufacturers offer customer rebates? In
practice, rebates are frequently used especially by the American auto manufacturers with
the goal of increasing market share. One reason for the use of rebates might be the increased
awareness and market potential. In addition, in practice, market demand is most likely
stochastic rather than deterministic. In such situations, the timing of the decisions, as well
as the information possessed at the time of the decisions become critical for the success
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Figure 11: Timeline of decisions (monopoly)
of promotions. In the next section, we show that demand uncertainty may explain the
American auto manufacturers’ choice of customer rebates over retailer incentives.
3.3.2 Uncertain Market Potential Model
In this section, we introduce uncertainty to the demand through the market potential by con-
sidering two demand states, high (h) and low (l), with respective probabilities β and 1− β,
β ∈ [0, 1]. Correspondingly, we represent the inverse demand functions as P (Qj) = aj−bQj ,
where j = l, h. Although this is a simplification of demand uncertainty in reality, it helps us
to capture the effects of uncertainty on the decisions of the retailer and the manufacturer.
In the auto industry, the dealers are closer to the end market and have more information
about the customers, therefore we assume that the retailer knows the demand state. In
addition, dealers do not have to report sales directly back to manufacturers, therefore man-
ufacturers may not have timely and accurate demand information. In recent years, it has
become possible for the manufacturers to buy demand information although there may be a
delay and transactions may be averaged. The manufacturers usually have a forecast based
on past sales, or they may estimate whether demand is high or low based on signals from
the market, web interest or economic indicators, which may include uncertainties.
In the presence of uncertainty, the manufacturer makes her decisions in two stages. In the
first stage, she determines the wholesale price; in the second stage, after the demand state
is revealed, she chooses to offer either a retailer incentive, customer rebate or no promotion.
As in the deterministic model, the retailer determines the optimal order/sales quantity given
the manufacturer’s decisions. We illustrate the timeline of decisions in Figure 11.
Similar to Section 3.3.1, we analyze three cases, i.e., the retailer incentive, customer
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Table 5: The SPNE for the uncertain market potential model with no promotion
ah − al ≤ al −m− c ah − al ≥ al −m− c



























rebate and no promotion, and then compare the results. The solution procedure for finding
the SPNE is again backward induction, starting with the retailer’s problem, which we
solve for both high and low demand states. Next, we solve the manufacturer’s problem of
determining the optimal promotion values for both high and low states. The final step in the
induction is to maximize the manufacturer’s expected profit, i.e., ΠMi = βΠ
Mh
i +(1−β)ΠMli
by choosing the optimal wholesale price, where ΠMji ; j = l, h is the manufacturer’s profit
in demand state j with promotion type i. We denote the expected market potential with
a = βah + (1− β)al.
Theorem 4 When the market potential is uncertain, the SPNE corresponding to the cases
where the manufacturer offers no promotion, a lump-sum amount of incentive to the retailer,
and a per-unit rebate to the end customers are summarized as follows:
(i) No promotion: see Table 5, where β = (a
l−m−c)2
(ah−al)2 .
(ii) Retailer incentive: see Table 6.
(iii) Customer rebate: wR −Rj = aj+c−m2 ; QjR = a
j−m−c







8b , j = l, h.
In the cases of no-promotion and retailer incentive, we obtain a unique equilibrium for
a given set of system parameters. In both cases, the feasible solutions that are candidates
for being the unique equilibrium are of two types: the wholesale price is either driven by
the expected market potential, a, (expectation driven wholesale price or solution) or only
by the high market potential, ah, (high-demand driven wholesale price or solution). In the
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Table 6: Dominating feasible solutions for the uncertain market potential demand model
with retailer incentive
Feasible Region (F.R.) Solution
ah ≤ 2m + c RI.2, RI.6
β ≤ 2m+c−al
ah−al RI.2, RI.3




ah ≥ 2al − c 2m+c−al





2m + c ≤ ah ≤ 2al − 2m− c RI.5, RI.1
al ≥ 2m + c 2al − 2m− c ≤ ah ≤ 2al − c RI.4, RI.1
β ≤ al−c
ah−al RI.4, RI.1
ah ≥ 2al − c β ≥ al−c
ah−al RI.4
RI.1 RI.2 RI.3 RI.4
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F.R: al≥ 2m + c ah≤ 2m+c
ah≤ 2al −m− c
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former, the manufacturer is able to make positive sales whether the realized demand is low
or high, whereas in the latter, she cannot generate any sales when the realized demand is
low. The manufacturer faces a tradeoff between the loss of profit she incurs in the following
two events. In the first event, she keeps the wholesale price “average” (by considering both
states) and sees a high demand, which happens with a probability of β. In the second
event, she keeps the wholesale price “high” (by only considering the high state) and sees
a low demand, which happens with a probability of 1 − β. Being a risk neutral decision
maker, the manufacturer chooses the event that brings highest expected profit. Intuitively,
we expect that the loss incurred in the former event would increase in β. For all expectation
driven solutions, we can show that the expected loss of profit in the former event increases
in ah and decreases in al. This suggests that the high-demand driven wholesale price brings
higher expected profit to the manufacturer when β and ah − al are “high”.
Observation 2 In the case of no-promotion, when the difference between high and low
market potentials is relatively “small” (i.e., ah − al ≤ al − m − c), or β is “low” (i.e.,
β ≤ β), the equilibrium for the manufacturer is driven by the expectation over the high and
low market potentials. Otherwise, the wholesale price depends on the high market potential,
but not on the low market potential. Finally, as the gap between ah and al increases, β
decreases. (See Figure 12 for an example.)
 







Figure 12: No promotion equilibrium wholesale price with increasing ah (m = 5, b = 2, c =
15)
In Figure 13, we see that the manufacturer’s equilibrium behavior in the retailer incentive
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case is similar to the no-promotion case. In this example, two feasible solutions correspond-
ing to the system parameters are RI.4 (high-demand driven solution) and RI.1 (expectation
driven solution) in Table 6. When ah − al is “low”, RI.1 provides a higher profit for the
manufacturer. As we increase ah in Figures 13(b) and 13(c), when β ≥ β∗ = (al−c)2−2m2
(ah−al)2 ,
RI.4 results in a higher profit for the manufacturer. Note also that β∗ decreases in (ah−al).
In Figure 14, we observe a behavior similar to that in Figure 13 when the gap between ah
and al is small, but al is very close to m + c, i.e., the manufacturer’s profit is very low in
case of low demand.
 




















Figure 13: Retailer incentive equilibrium wholesale price with increasing ah (m = 5, b =



















Figure 14: Retailer incentive equilibrium wholesale price with increasing ah (m = 20, b =
1, c = 30)
In Appendix B.7, we extend our analysis with uncertain market potential by adding a
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“medium” state. While this complicates the analytical tractability considerably, we show
from examples that our main insights obtained with two states and three states are similar,
i.e., when the probability of a high state is sufficiently high, the equilibrium decision moves
from being an expectation-driven solution to a solution only dependent on high demand.
Finally, we analyze the equilibrium in the customer rebate case stated in Theorem 4(iii).
Note that, although the manufacturer determines the wholesale price before knowing the
demand state, she has the opportunity to adjust it with a rebate according to the demand
state. This is obviously an advantage for the manufacturer and as we will see in Observa-
tion 3, depending on the system parameters, the manufacturer may be better off offering a
customer rebate instead of retailer incentive when there is demand uncertainty.
Next, we compare the promotions under uncertain market potential. From Theo-
rem 4(i)-(iii), we can show that offering no promotion is the least profitable option and
generates the lowest sales for the manufacturer. The comparison of the retailer incentive
and customer rebate promotions shows that unlike the deterministic demand case in Sec-
tion 3.3.1, when there is demand uncertainty neither the retailer incentive nor the customer
rebate has an absolute dominance over the other. Depending on system parameters, espe-
cially related to uncertainty, the manufacturer may find customer rebate or retailer incentive
more profitable.
Observation 3 When the market potential is uncertain and the uncertainty is “high”, i.e.,
when (ah − al) is “large” and β is in the “middle” of the range, offering a customer rebate
may be more profitable than a retailer incentive for the manufacturer. (See Figure 15 for
an example.)
In Figure 15, we continue with the example illustrated in Figure 13. We observe that
as (ah − al) increases, the β range (β1, β2) where the customer rebate is more profitable
than the retailer incentive shifts to the left approaching the origin. We analytically derive
this comparative static result for this example in Proposition 1. Note that β∗ denotes the
threshold value where the equilibrium switches from RI.1 to RI.4. When β1 ≤ β ≤ β∗,








Figure 15: Comparison of retailer incentive and customer rebate with increasing ah (m =
5, b = 2, c = 15)
gives a higher profit than RI.4. Therefore (β1, β2) denotes the range where the manufacturer
is better off with a customer rebate. We also observe that (β1, β2) becomes smaller as
(ah − al) increases (Figure 15(c)). This suggests that uncertainty can be one reason for
auto manufacturers to offer rebates.
Proposition 1 When β1 ≤ β∗ ≤ β2, as ah increases and al decreases ((ah−al) increases),
β∗, β1, and β2 decrease. (β∗ =
(al−c)2−2m2








In Figure 16, we plot the retailer’s profits for the example in Figure 15. We see that
when the market potential is uncertain and the realized demand state turns out to be
“low”, the retailer obtains higher profits with a customer rebate. If the realized demand
state turns out to be “high”, when β is “low”, the retailer’s profits are higher with a retailer
incentive; otherwise he obtains higher profits with a customer rebate. We can explain
this observation as follows. When β is “low”, the manufacturer’s wholesale price decision
is driven by expectation when she offers a retailer incentive, and as β decreases w also
decreases. After the manufacturer makes the wholesale price decision under uncertainty,
if the actual demand state turns out to be “high”, the retailer is able to generate higher
profits with a retailer incentive than a customer rebate because he is able to order/sell more
(with a lower wholesale price), and moreover receives an incentive (Kh) to further increase





























Figure 16: The retailer’s profit under retailer incentive and customer rebate with increas-
ing ah (m = 5, b = 2, c = 15)
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3.3.3 Uncertain Price Sensitivity Model
In this section, we consider uncertainty in price sensitivity, i.e., P (Qj) = a− bjQj ; j = l, h,
where P (Qj) is the price when Qj units are sold with price sensitivity bj in state j = l, h.
We repeat the analysis in Section 3.3.2, and find the SPNE for the cases of no promotion,
retailer incentive, and customer rebate. (See Table 7 for the equilibrium solutions.)
We observe that when there is uncertainty in price sensitivity, offering customer rebate
is identical to offering no promotion from the manufacturer’s point of view. Moreover,
for any market condition, the manufacturer’s profit and the quantity sold is higher under
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retailer incentive compared to customer rebate or no promotion in both demand states. This
observation arises because the wholesale price decision is independent of price sensitivity
and therefore the manufacturer’s decisions are identical to the deterministic demand case.
3.3.4 Combined Promotions: Retailer Incentive and Customer Rebate
In practice, manufacturers sometimes choose to offer a combination of retailer incentive and
customer rebate. In this section, we aim to obtain insights on how effective it is to offer
both promotions at the same time. We summarize the equilibrium solutions in Table 8.
When demand is deterministic, the manufacturer’s profit and total sales when she offers
retailer incentive and customer rebate simultaneously are equal to her profit and total sales
when she offers retailer incentive alone. In Section 3.3.1 we have seen that the manufac-
turer’s profit remains the same when she offers a customer rebate instead of no promotion,
while she increases her profits by offering a retailer incentive. It is indeed expected that
combined promotions, being a hybrid of the customer rebate and the retailer incentive
promotions, will not do any better than the retailer incentive itself for the deterministic
demand case. With the same reasoning, we also expect that combining two promotions
will not improve the profits when there is uncertainty in price sensitivity, and confirm by
Table 8(b).
However, for the uncertain market potential model, we have observed situations where
customer rebate was performing better than the retailer incentive as well as situations
where the opposite holds. Clearly, by combining these promotions, the manufacturer is
expected to do at least as well as the case when she uses each promotion individually.
The question is whether the manufacturer is able to do strictly better when she offers both
promotions simultaneously. Our analysis of the equilibrium decisions shows that this is true,
i.e., the manufacturer’s total profit is higher if she offers two promotions (retailer incentive
and customer rebate) at the same time rather than offering any one of them individually.
Moreover, the combined promotions generate more sales than the retailer incentive, except
for some instances with ah ≥ al ≥ 2m+c or al ≤ 2m+c ≤ ah. Under all market conditions,
combined promotions generate more sales than the customer rebate alone.
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Table 8: The SPNE for the combined promotions
(a) Deterministic Demand Model
a ≤ 2m + c a ≥ 2m + c





















(b) Uncertain Price Sensitivity Model
a ≤ 2m + c a ≥ 2m + c
wC −Rj ; j = l, h a−m a+c2
































(c) Uncertain Market Potential Model
ah ≥ al ≥ 2m + c al ≤ 2m + c ≤ ah al ≤ ah ≤ 2m + c
wC −Rl al+c2 al −m al −m
















































































Figure 17: Profit improvement by combined promotions with increasing ah (m = 5, b =
2, c = 15)
Continuing with the example in Figure 15, we show the improvement in the manufac-
turer’s profits when she offers combined promotions as opposed to offering each promotion
individually (Figure 17). In this case, the manufacturer is able to increase her profits by
as much as 18% by combining two promotions. The improvement in the manufacturer’s
profits decreases as the gap between the market potentials (ah − al) increases. We can
explain this behavior as follows. As (ah − al) increases, the manufacturer is better off with
a high-demand driven equilibrium, i.e., behaving as if she is in a deterministic setting with
a market potential of ah. We have seen that when demand is deterministic, the retailer
incentive is always better than the customer rebate. Therefore, we expect that the profit
increase achieved by combining the two promotions in an effectively deterministic setting is
not as high as the profit increase in a setting with uncertainty where both promotions may
improve the manufacturer’s profits.
3.4 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we analyze two different types of promotions, customer rebates and re-
tailer incentives, which are commonly used by manufacturers in the auto industry. We
consider several models with different demand characteristics to determine under which
market conditions one promotion is more effective than the other in terms of increasing the
manufacturer’s profits and sales. Our setting is a two stage supply chain with an uncapaci-
tated manufacturer and a retailer who can do perfect price discrimination in a market with
price sensitive demand.
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We show that when demand is deterministic and rebates do not lead to market expan-
sion, customer rebates are not effective in increasing the manufacturer’s sales and profits,
and the manufacturer is always better off with a retailer incentive. If the rebates lead to an
increase in the market potential possibly through advertising but at an additional cost, the
manufacturer may prefer the customer rebate over the retailer incentive when the increase
in the market potential is sufficient enough to cover the cost of promoting.
We show that when the market potential is uncertain, neither the retailer incentive nor
the customer rebate has an absolute dominance over the other. We observe that when the
uncertainty is high, the customer rebate performs better than the retailer incentive. On
the other hand, when the uncertainty is on the price sensitivity parameter of the demand
function, we obtain identical results to the deterministic setting where the profits and sales
generated with a retailer incentive are higher than those of a customer rebate. We also
show that offering combined promotions improves the manufacturer’s profits and sales only
if there is uncertainty in the market potential.
We have seen that uncertainty can be an important factor in determining whether to
offer a customer rebate or retailer incentive. We investigate whether our analytical findings
are in line with what we observe in practice, in particular, whether different promotions
offered by the American auto manufacturers (customer rebates based promotions) and the
Japanese auto manufacturers (retailer incentives based promotions) can be explained by
the variability of the demand that they observe. Since the actual demand data is not
available, we use sales as an approximation of demand and we take the variability of sales
to represent uncertainty in demand for this analysis unless described otherwise. We focus
on the following two questions: 1) Is there any statistical evidence for the rebates by the
American auto manufacturers being higher than those by the Japanese auto manufacturers?
2) Is the sales variability of the American vehicles higher than the Japanese vehicles?
We analyze three car segments: midsize, compact size and utility vehicle. In Figure 18,
we plot the rebate percentages for compact size and utility vehicle segments. A quick
inspection of the graphs shows that the rebate percentages used by the American auto
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(a) Compact size models
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(b) Utility vehicle models
Figure 18: Total registrations and average rebate percentages of compact size and utility
vehicle models
manufacturers are higher than the Japanese auto manufacturers for all car segments in-
cluding the midsize segment displayed in Figure 8. We observe that the demand for cars is
highly seasonal with the peak seasons in late summer-early fall and late winter-early spring.
Table 9 summarizes the basic statistics related with the data sets for the compact, mid-
size, and utility vehicle segments. Although these values may help to test the hypotheses,
one should be careful using them because the registrations and the rebates are time series
data with possible autocorrelations and therefore may lack independence. In order to test
the variability differences, ideally we need to separate out the effects of uncertainty from
seasonality. For these reasons, instead of the actual registrations, we use the normalized
data where each data point is normalized with the total registrations in the corresponding
61
month, and we then divide the normalized data points into non-overlapping batches and
take the batch means as the data points. (Batch means method is frequently used for the
estimation of mean and variances in simulation output analysis; e.g., see Alexopoulos et
al. [3].)
Table 9: Summary statistics
Total number of Registrations Rebate Percentages
Mean CoV∗ Mean % CoV
Segment U.S. Japan U.S. Japan U.S. Japan U.S. Japan
Midsize 48,574.58 66,942.86 0.18 0.13 6.24 0.33 0.48 0.85
Compact 35,977.94 42,078 0.20 0.16 9.48 0.50 0.33 0.86
Utility 52,459.75 18,729.42 0.29 0.17 2.87 1.02 0.57 0.64
∗CoV(Coefficient of variation) = standard deviationmean
Our results suggest that the rebates by the American auto manufacturers are statisti-
cally significantly higher than the rebates by the Japanese auto manufacturers at the 95%
confidence level. We have weaker results for the variability differences; at 90% confidence
level, there is evidence that the sales variability of the American auto manufacturers is
higher than that of the Japanese auto manufacturers for the midsize and utility vehicle
segments, but not for the compact segment. As we mentioned before, we relate the vari-
ability in sales with the uncertainty in demand. Therefore, the higher variability in demand
by the American auto manufacturers could explain their choice of rebates as an important
promotion mechanism as our analytical results suggested that the rebates improve profits
and sales most when there is high uncertainty. However, it would be useful to further in-
vestigate the effect of rebates on the variability of demand. It might be the case that the
American auto manufacturers started using the rebates for some other reason, but then
as they offered high rebates in some periods and no rebates in others, they added more
variability to the demand that they see. Identifying if rebates cause variability or if rebates
are offered because of variability is very difficult and we leave this for future research.
Our work analytically compares different promotions used in the auto industry, which
is very important for the manufacturers. However, there are many further questions of
interest in this area. For example, it would be useful to add the sales effort decisions of
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the dealers into the analysis, since effort may play important role in increasing sales. Issues
of supply chain coordination in this setting could also be useful as well as the aspects of
customer behavior such as strategic buying.
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CHAPTER IV
SALES PROMOTIONS IN THE PRESENCE OF COMPETITION
4.1 Introduction
Promotions are widely used by manufacturers and retailers in varying degrees across differ-
ent industries. In some cases, companies offer promotions to increase sales, advertise new
products or to reduce their inventories; in others, promotions are used as strategic tools to
react to the competitors’ actions. As we have discussed in Chapter 3, the auto industry in
the U.S. is one example where promotions play an important role in the marketing strate-
gies of the companies. In this industry, it is commonly observed that promotions offered by
one manufacturer lead competitors to start or intensify their own promotions. For example,
General Motors introduced zero-percent financing option in September 2001, which was
quickly followed by similar promotions by Ford and Chrysler. More recently, in response to
increasing gasoline prices in the U.S., Ford started to offer an extra $1,000 cash rebate in
addition to rebates of up to $4,000 on certain models. Analysts expect a “new rebate war
among U.S. automakers” in 2007 and state that Ford’s new rebate program “could cause
some manufacturers to increase their incentives programs on select models in response to
Ford’s actions” [5].
Competition may impact the manufacturers’ promotion decisions. In Figure 19, we use
data sets from a major market research firm and plot the rebates offered by two American
auto manufacturers in the period June 2000-May 2003. The cross-correlation between the
two time series data is 0.87, and there is an increasing trend in rebate amounts for both man-
ufacturers. Although the correlation itself is not sufficient to claim that the manufacturers’
rebate promotions were closely affected by those of the competitor, there is also significant
anecdotal evidence for competitive effects of promotions, e.g., the employee discount pro-
gram was initiated by General Motors in June 2005, which increased the manufacturer’s
sales by 41% in that month, and it was matched by Chrysler and Ford the next month.
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Original Equipment Manufacturer 1 - American (% Rebate of 2 models)
Original Equipment Manufacturer 2 - American (% Rebate of 2 models)
Figure 19: Rebates by two competing American auto manufacturers in the U.S. market
In Chapter 3, we analyzed “customer rebate” and “retailer incentive” promotions in a
two-stage supply chain with a single manufacturer and single retailer and determined which
promotion would benefit the monopolistic manufacturer under which market conditions.
We modelled a customer rebate in the form of a per-unit payment from the manufacturer
to the end customer, and a retailer incentive in the form of lump-sum payment from the
manufacturer to the dealer; both forms are observed in practice. In this chapter, we extend
this research by analyzing a duopoly setting with two competitive manufacturers who sell
their products at their exclusive retailers, who are also competitors in the end market.
Our goal is to investigate the impact of competition on manufacturers’ promotion and
pricing decisions, retailers’ order/sales quantity decisions, as well as the profits of the firms.
One question is whether including competition will change which promotion is better for
a manufacturer. We are also interested in using our models to explain the manufacturers’
promotion choices observed in practice. We adopt a game theoretical framework to analyze
the problems.
This chapter is organized as follows. We review the relevant literature in Section 4.2. In
Section 4.3, we explain our assumptions, describe the competitive interactions in the supply
chains, and present our models. We summarize our results in Section 4.4.
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4.2 Literature Review
Sales promotions have been extensively studied in the marketing and economics literature
especially in non-durable goods industries with posted prices. (e.g., see Ailawadi and Nes-
lin [2], Blattberg et al. [10], Neslin and Stone [62] and Wansink and Deshpande [83].)
Different than these articles, we focus on industries where the sales price is negotiated. The
auto industry is a good example where consumption rates are low, prices are high and can
be negotiated with the customers.
Narasimhan [60] analyzes the role of coupons in achieving price discrimination in indus-
tries where the manufacturers sell directly to the buyers. In another stream of research,
promotions are analyzed in two-stage supply chains where manufacturers sell through re-
tailers. Gerstner and Hess [32], Khrishnan et al. [50], and Taylor [77] focus on the use of
promotions in channel coordination, where the latter two articles also consider retailers that
exert sales effort to influence demand. Ernst and Powell [27] analyze a setting where the
manufacturer can offer an incentive to increase the retailer’s service level and to capture ad-
ditional demand. We do not consider retailers’ sales effort or find mechanisms to coordinate
the channels. Our focus is on understanding how competition affects the manufacturers’
promotion decisions, where the manufacturers and their retailers operate in decentralized
supply chains similar to those in the auto industry.
Several studies analyze promotions in competitive supply chains, e.g., Lal et al. [52],
Narasimhan [61], and Steenkamp et al. [75]. Kim and Staelin [47] study a four-player
model where competition exists both at the manufacturers’ level and the retailers’ level
of the supply chain, similar to ours. However, since their model relates to the consumer
packaged goods industry, the retailers sell both manufacturers’ products at a fixed price,
which is different than our setting in the auto industry where the retailers operate exclusively
and negotiate prices. The authors only analyze promotions from the manufacturers to the
retailers where the promotions are in the form of side payments, corresponding to the lump-
sum incentives in our setting; in addition we also analyze rebates to customers. Gerstner et
al. [33] study the price discriminating role of a pull-discount promotion (customer rebate)
for a monopolist manufacturer where the competition is only among the retailers. The
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authors analyze a market with two customer segments, one with high and the other with
low willingness to pay for one unit of product. Benefiting from the pull-discount is costly
for the former, but free for the latter segment. In our analysis, we allow competition both
among the manufacturers and the retailers. We assume that customer rebates are redeemed
by all buyers without any cost, which is a common practice in the auto industry. Examples
of research that analyze competitive supply chains but do not consider promotions include
Choi [18], McGuire and Staelin [57], Moorthy [58], and Trivedi [80], where the authors
analyze the manufacturers’ channel structure decisions. We do not focus on the decisions
on channel structure since the auto manufacturers sell their products through exclusive
and independent dealers in the U.S. Our focus is on analyzing the promotional decisions
of the competing manufacturers and their effects on the entire supply chain. Boyaci and
Gallego [11] study a competitive setting similar to ours with two wholesalers supplying two
retailers in various scenarios with coordination or decentralization within each supply chain.
In their analysis, wholesalers and retailers compete on the basis of customer service where
the retailers charge similar prices, while we analyze retailers that price discriminate and
compete directly in sales quantity.
In the auto industry, analysis of promotions has attracted some attention from re-
searchers due to the economic significance of the industry and the auto manufacturers’
increased use of promotions in the recent years. Empirical studies have investigated diverse
issues such as price discrimination by auto dealers (Goldberg [36], Scott Morton et al. [70],
and Zettelmeyer et al. [86]), dealers’ pass-through rates of promotions to the car buyers
(Busse et al. [15] and Crafton and Hoffer [23]), the impact of new product introductions and
promotional incentives on firms’ profits (Pauwels et al. [66]), and the effects of promotions
on customer and dealer behaviors (Keskinocak et al. [46]). Bruce et al. [12, 13] analytically
study promotions offered by the durable goods manufacturers using game theoretical mod-
els and perform empirical studies with data from the auto industry. Bruce et al. [12] focus
on promotions from the manufacturers to the retailers (trade promotions), which are in the
form of wholesale price discounts based on the retailers’ sales levels. The authors consider
a channel structure that is similar to ours where two competing manufacturers sell their
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products exclusively through two competing retailers, although in their case the dealer sets
a fixed price and customer rebates are not analyzed. They incorporate the effects of a sec-
ondary market for the goods through a durability measure, and find that the manufacturer
with the more durable good benefits more from trade promotions. They also find that in
equilibrium, both manufacturers find it optimal to offer trade promotions to their retailers.
Bruce et al. [13] analyze cash rebates and the effect of the product’s durability on the
manufacturer’s decisions, but ignores competition. The authors show that lower durability
of a manufacturer’s products leads to higher cash rebates. In their analysis, the dealer sets
a fixed price and dealer incentives are not analyzed.
Our research differs from the cited articles in that the retailers price discriminate. This
is mainly motivated by the practices in the auto industry where the final purchase price of
a vehicle is negotiated between the dealer and the buyer. As a result, the dealer has the
opportunity to learn the customer’s willingness to pay and price discriminate accordingly.
Spulber [74] and White and Walker [84] analyze models with first-degree (perfect) price
discrimination, however neither considers manufacturers’ promotion decisions in two-stage
supply chains where competition exists both among the manufacturers and the retailers,
which is the focus of our study. In Chapter 3, we showed that price discrimination mat-
ters even in the monopolistic setting, therefore it is useful to include it in the analysis of
competing retailers, since price discrimination and competition are important in the auto
industry.
4.3 Models
We analyze promotion and sales decisions in a setting with two competing manufacturers
who sell their products through two independent retailers who are also competitors in
the end market. We differentiate the supply chains with the subscript i = 1, 2, and we
assume retailer i sells products of manufacturer i exclusively, which is commonly observed
in practice in the form of franchised dealerships of the auto manufacturers. In practice,
a dealer may own multiple dealerships or retail outlets although each outlet tends to be
operated by a separate management. Auto manufacturers generally keep their wholesale
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prices constant for the model year and they offer incentives in order to respond to demand
changes. Therefore we assume that retailer i purchases from his manufacturer at a wholesale
price wi, which is determined by the manufacturer at the beginning of the model year or
selling period.
Below, we summarize further assumptions that are common with those in Chapter 3.
• There is a single selling period.
• Retailers can do perfect price discrimination.
• Retailer i has a reservation price wi + mi, below which he is not willing to sell.
• Manufacturers have ample capacity.
• There are no administrative and redemption costs associated with the promotions.
• All parameters are common knowledge and all parties seek to maximize their own
profits.
Next, we construct the basic demand model that incorporates competition. Since we
analyze price discriminating retailers, we use an inverse demand function that relates price to
each unit sold. Inverse demand functions are appropriately used to model the firms’ profits
when they can do perfect price discrimination (Spulber [74] and White and Walker [84]).
To model competition, we also need to incorporate the substitution effects between the
retailers’ products or sales. Most articles in the literature model competition by reflecting
the characteristic that a firm’s demand (or sales) is downward sloping in the firm’s own price,
and upward sloping in the competitor’s price as a result of substitution (Kim and Staelin [48]
and McGuire and Staelin [57]). However, these articles do not consider inverse demand
models and use demand functions that relate quantity to the fixed selling prices of the firms.
We combine characteristics from price discrimination models and competition/substitution
models to develop our demand model.
We assume demand is deterministic and has the form shown in Equation 1. The basic
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structure of the (inverse) demand function is linear, as used in some auto manufactur-





a− (bio + bic)Qi if Qi ≤ Qj
a− bioQi − bicQj otherwise
i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j. (1)
Pi(Qi, Qj) denotes the price retailer i receives when he sells Qi units and the competing
retailer sells Qj units. We denote the maximum price with a, which is the market potential
when sensitivity is fixed, and we assume that the retailers have identical market potentials.
We denote the effect of retailer i’s sales on his own price with bio (own price sensitivity),
and the effect of the competitor’s sales on retailer i’s price with bic (cross price sensitivity).
Our demand model incorporates the competitive nature of sales by capturing the following
behavior: as the sales/order quantity of one retailer increases, the price that he can receive
from each additional unit drops due to his own sales as well as the competitor’s sales, both
of which are affected by the price sensitivity parameters. (See Appendix C for further
discussion on demand model.)
The demand function of retailer 1 is shown in Figure 20 corresponding to the case where
he generates higher sales than his competitor. Retailer 1 is competing with retailer 2 on
the first segment of the demand function until his sales reach his competitor’s sales Q2, and
he is selling additional units beyond Q2 on the second segment of the demand function.
Retailer i is experiencing a faster decrease in the price that the customers are willing to pay
on the first segment of his demand function than that on the second segment. We expect
that retailer i’s own decisions will impact his demand more than his competitor’s decisions,
therefore we assume bio ≥ bic and bio ≥ bjc, i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j.
Table 10 summarizes our notation. Note that the manufacturers cannot make positive
profits unless they sell above their costs, therefore wi ≥ ci, i = 1, 2. It follows from the
retailers’ reservation prices that Pi(0, 0) = a ≥ wi +mi, which together with wi ≥ ci implies
that a ≥ mi + ci, i = 1, 2; otherwise either the manufacturer or the dealer would not sell
any units. Since the manufacturers do not sell below their costs and the retailers satisfy
their reservation prices, a′i = a − mi − ci represents the highest profit retailers can earn,










Figure 20: Demand function with competition
as the “total” price sensitivity of manufacturer i since the selling price is affected by both
bio and bic in the region where the retailers sell simultaneously. In the rest of the paper, we
denote the manufacturer or the retailer with higher sales quantity as the “market leader”.
Table 10: Notation for Chapter 4
a : Market potential
bio : Retailer i’s price sensitivity of own customers, i = 1, 2
bic : Retailer i’s competitor’s price sensitivity of customers affecting
retailer i’s price
Qki : Retailer i’s order/sales quantity under promotion type k ∈ (o, I, R)
(o =no promotion, I =retailer incentive, R =customer rebate)
Pi(Qi, Qj) : Retailer i’s price when the retailers sell Qi, Qj units respectively
(i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j)
ΠMik : Profit of manufacturer i under promotion k
ΠDik : Profit of retailer i under promotion k
wi : Wholesale price of manufacturer i
wi + mi : Reservation price of retailer i
ci : Production cost of manufacturer i
Ki : Lump-sum incentive given to retailer i by manufacturer i
Ri : Per unit customer rebate offered by manufacturer i
δi : The effect of manufacturer i’s rebate on the competitor’s market potential
A′ : Complement of set A including all elements in the set of real numbers
not in A
Figure 21 illustrates the interactions in the supply chains. The manufacturers move first
and simultaneously make their wholesale price and promotion decisions. Next, the retailers
observe the manufacturers’ decisions and simultaneously make their order/sales quantity
decisions. Thus, the simultaneous decision games are embedded in a Stackelberg framework
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Wholesale price , 
incentive , rebate , or none
Manufacturer 1




Wholesale price , 
incentive , rebate , or none
Manufacturer 2






Figure 21: Timeline of decisions (competition)
with the manufacturers acting as the leaders and the retailers as the followers, where the
manufacturers consider the retailers’ responses while making their own decisions. Unlike
the newly introduced promotional programs such as employee discount programs and zero-
percent financing where manufacturers’ actions may represent leader-follower situations,
customer rebates and dealer incentives are more established types of promotions for which
it is reasonable to assume neither of the manufacturers acts as the first-mover or has higher
market power than the other. We are interested in the SPNE outcomes where none of the
firms has an incentive to deviate from their decisions, and we use backward induction to
find such equilibria.
We analyze four combinations of promotions. In Section 4.3.1, we present the base
model where no promotion is offered by the manufacturers. In Sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3,
we analyze the cases where both manufacturers offer the same type of promotion: retailer
incentives Ki and customer rebates Ri, i = 1, 2, respectively. Finally, we analyze the
case where one manufacturer offers a retailer incentive while the other offers a customer
rebate. In each case, we formulate the optimization problems of the manufacturers and the
retailers, and we summarize the results from backward induction, which follows the timeline
in Figure 21. Given the manufacturers’ decisions, we solve the retailers’ problems and find
the equilibrium as a function of the manufacturers’ decisions. In the second step, we solve
the manufacturers’ problems by embedding the retailers’ best responses into the problem
formulations. We solve for the SPNE explicitly when possible and provide observations
through numerical examples otherwise.
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4.3.1 No Promotion
We first consider the case where the manufacturers do not offer any promotions, thus they
only make wholesale price decisions and the retailers set their order/sales quantities. The
models and results are as follows.
Step 1. The retailers’ order/sales quantity decisions: The retailers simultane-
ously decide how much to order/sell to maximize their own profits given the manufacturers’
wholesale price decisions. We show the formulations of the retailers’ problems for the case






(a− (b1o + b1c)Q1)dQ1 − w1Q1








(a− (b2o + b2c)Q2)dQ2 +
∫ Q2
Q1
(a− b2oQ2 − b2cQ1)dQ2 − w2Q2






Both retailers have the objective of maximizing their profits. The constraints imply
no products are sold below the reservation prices of the retailers, where P1(Q1, Q2) =
a − (b1o + b1c)Q1 ≥ w1 + m1 ⇒ Q1 ≤ a−w1−m1b1o+b1c , and P2(Q2, Q1) = a − b2oQ2 − b2cQ1 ≥




We find the retailers’ best responses to the manufacturers’ wholesale prices as follows.
(Note that, (x)+ = max{0, x}.)










































































The retailers’ equilibrium in response to the manufacturers’ wholesale prices (w1, w2) is
as shown in Table 11, where b′i = bio + bic, i = 1, 2.
Step 2. The manufacturers’ wholesale price decisions: The manufacturers si-
multaneously choose their wholesale prices to maximize their own profits anticipating the
best responses of the retailers.
ΠMio = max
wi≥ci
(wi − ci)Q∗i , i = 1, 2
Theorem 5 When there is no promotion offered by the manufacturers, the SPNE is as
shown in Table 12, where a′i = a−mi − ci and b′i = bio + bic, i = 1, 2.
Table 12: The SPNE with no promotion
2b′1a
′
2 ≥ (b2c + 2b2o)a′1








































































(1) F.R.1 ∩ F.R.2 SPNE.1, SPNE.2
(2) F.R.1 ∩ F.R.2′ SPNE.1
(3) F.R.1′ ∩ F.R.2 SPNE.2
Both equilibria can be observed in the region denoted by (1), whereas the supply chain
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members reach a unique equilibrium in the regions denoted by (2) and (3). (Note that
the entire space of feasible parameters is completely partitioned by the preceding feasible
regions, where the regions are determined a priori by the system parameters.) From Ta-
ble 12, when bic = 0, it trivially follows that manufacturer i achieves the monopoly profits





(Chapter 3), where a′i = a−mi − ci, i = 1, 2. This may be seen in practice
when the manufacturer has a loyal customer base such as for certain luxury vehicles. In Ob-
servation 4, we compare the profits of a manufacturer in the monopolistic and competitive
settings.
Observation 4 When bic > 0, i = 1, 2, both manufacturers obtain lower profits when there
is competition than when they are monopolies. (See Equations 2 and 3 for SPNE.1; the

























In Observation 5, we determine the market leader corresponding to the different SPNE.
Observation 5 When the supply chain members are in SPNE.1 (SPNE.2), manufacturer


















1 − (b1c + 2b1o)a′2 ≥ 0 (5)
In order to predict the outcome of the interactions between the supply chain members,
it is desirable to know when a unique equilibrium is achieved. In Observation 6, we iden-
tify some conditions where we observe unique equilibria and analyze the sensitivity of the
manufacturers’ profits to the system parameters.
Observation 6 When the manufacturers have identical net market potentials, i.e., a′1 =
a′2, and manufacturer 2’s total price sensitivity is lower than that of manufacturer 1, i.e.,








o . Manufacturer 2’s profit changes at a faster rate in response to changes in
b2o, m2, and c2 compared to the changes in b2c, m1, and c1, respectively, which implies that
the market leader’s profit is more sensitive to own parameters than those of the competitors.
All results are symmetric for SPNE.2, i.e., if 2b′1 ≤ b′2 + b2o, then SPNE.2 is the unique







Table 13 shows the comparative statics for the manufacturers’ profits when SPNE.1 is
the unique equilibrium.
Table 13: The impact of parameters on the profits of the manufacturers. ↙ implies
decrease and ↗ implies increase with increasing values of the parameters.








o ↗ ↗ ↙ ↙ ↗ ↙ ↗ ↙
In the U.S., the sales of the American auto manufacturers show a declining trend while
the non-American auto manufacturers have increased their market shares in the recent
years [59]. We also find from our data sets that the new vehicle registrations of the compact
and midsize vehicles by the American auto manufacturers totaled 4.5M and 6M, respec-
tively, versus 5.2M and 7.4M by the Japanese auto manufacturers. Although this can be
due to several reasons, one empirical work shows that the American manufacturers face
higher price sensitivity in their demands for the compact and midsize car segments than
the Japanese auto manufacturers (Keskinocak et al. [46]). These findings are consistent
with Observation 6, which suggests that the manufacturer with lower total price sensitivity
is the market leader.
In Examples 1 and 2, we show that the manufacturers’ profits are complex functions of
all system parameters making it difficult to characterize general relationships that hold in
all cases. In Example 1, we show that the market leader (in sales quantity) can make less
profit than the competing manufacturer. This situation is more likely to happen when the
competitor’s production cost and the reservation price of his retailer is lower than those of
the market leader.
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Example 1 When a = 150, b1o = 3, b1c = 1, b2o = 1.5, b2c = 1, c1 = 2, c2 = 10,m1 =





1 = 17.88, Q
o∗
2 = 29.04, where Π
M∗1
o = 1278.06, Π
M∗2
o = 1265.13.
In Example 2, we show that lower production cost and retailer’s reservation price do
not always guarantee higher profits for a manufacturer.
Example 2 When a = 50, b1o = 6, b1c = 1.5, b2o = 2, b2c = 1, c1 = 15, c2 = 20,m1 =





1 = 1.67, Q
o∗
2 = 3.33, where Π
M∗1
o = 20.83, Π
M∗2
o = 22.22.
Although manufacturer 1’s production cost is lower, she sells less units than manufac-
turer 2 partly due to higher own and cross price sensitivities, and she ends up with lower
profit.
4.3.2 Retailer Incentive
In this section, we look at the case where manufacturer i offers a lump-sum incentive Ki
to retailer i, i = 1, 2. The incentives allow the retailers to sell to customers they would
not have been able to reach otherwise. The retailers want to satisfy their reservation prices
wi + mi from each unit sold, therefore there is no reason they should use any incentive for
buyers who are willing to pay at least wi +mi. For other customers, the retailer can use the
incentive to compensate for the difference between the price that the customer pays and
the retailer’s reservation price. Although the auto manufacturers do not have direct control
over the use of dealer incentives and the dealers determine whether to use the incentives
during sales or not, empirical studies show that dealers indeed pass-through some part of the
incentives to the end customers (Busse et al. [15]). Other reasons for the retailers’ voluntary
participation in transferring the incentives to customers include the turn-and-earn system
for inventory allocation and advantages in receiving a better selection of vehicles in the
future, which is facilitated by a high volume of sales by the dealers.
Similar to the analysis in Section 4.3.1, we identify two cases while formulating the
retailers’ problems, i.e., QI1 ≤ QI2 and QI1 ≥ QI2. However, we need to analyze additional
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cases to determine the total amount of incentives used by the retailers.
In Figure 22, we analyze the case QI1 ≤ QI2 where retailer 2 is market leader. Note that
retailer 2 uses the incentive only for those sales with prices below w2 +m2. In Figure 22(a),
he uses the incentive on the second segment of his demand function where he is generating
additional sales beyond his competitor’s sales, and uses the incentive for all units between
the points denoted by A-B. By contrast, in Figure 22(b), the retailer uses the incentive
on both segments of his demand function for all units between the points denoted by C-E.
Each of these situations implies a different constraint on the reservation price requirement
for retailer 2. On the other hand, since QI1 ≤ QI2, retailer 1 is selling entirely on the first
segment of his demand function where both retailers are capturing market share. Therefore,
he uses the incentive only on this segment, which is illustrated in Figure 22(c) between the







(a) Retailer 2 uses K2 on the second seg-








(b) Retailer 2 uses K2 on both segments







(c) Retailer 1 uses K1 on the first segment of
the demand function
Figure 22: Retailers’ demand functions when both manufacturers give incentives and
retailer 2 is the market leader.
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Below, we summarize all possible cases to consider, where the reservation price require-
ment leads to different optimization problems for the retailers depending on the manufac-
turers’ wholesale price decisions: (Note that Case 1.a and Case 1.b are illustrated in Figures
22(a) and 22(b), respectively.)
Case 1) QI1 ≤ QI2 Case 2) QI1 ≥ QI2
Case 1.a)∃ Q2 ≥ QI1 : P2(Q2, QI1) ≤ w2+m2 Case 2.a)∃ Q1 ≥ QI2 : P1(Q1, QI2) ≤ w1+m1
Case 1.b)∃ Q2 ≤ QI1 : P2(Q2, QI1) ≤ w2+m2 Case 2.b)∃ Q1 ≤ QI2 : P1(Q1, QI2) ≤ w1+m1
We provide the formulations of the retailers’ problems for Case 1.a and Case 1.b; the
analysis of the symmetrical cases is similar.

















(a− (b2o + b2c)QI2)dQI2 +
∫ QI2
QI1








(w2 + m2 − (a− b2cQI1 − b2oQI2))dQI2 ≤ K2
QI2 ≥ QI1
In Case 1.b, the formulation of retailer 1’s problem and the objective function of retailer 2
remain the same as above. However, the constraints for retailer 2’s problem are modified
to reflect the retailer’s reservation price requirement as follows.









We state the best responses of the retailers to manufacturers’ wholesale price and in-









































































Given the best responses of the retailers, manufacturer i’s problem is as follows:
ΠMiI = maxwi≥ci,Ki≥0
(wi − ci)QI∗i −Ki
In our analysis, we model competition at both stages of the supply chain: the retailers
observe the manufacturers’ decisions and compete in sales; the manufacturers determine
their wholesale prices and promotion amounts by predicting the retailers’ equilibrium, and
they compete in sales and profits. Competitive interactions at both stages complicate the
analytical characterization of the equilibria considerably. This is also mentioned by Boyaci
and Gallego [11], where the authors study a setting similar to ours in terms of supply chain
structure and the timeline of decisions. Although the authors derive analytical expressions
for the retailers’ equilibrium, they use numerical schemes to compute the wholesalers’ Nash
equilibrium decisions. In our analysis, we were able to analytically derive the SPNE for the
base model in the no-promotion case (Section 4.3.1), however, we resort to computational
methods to find the equilibria (if any exist) in the case of retailer incentives.
Fudenberg and Tirole [28] discuss one iterative method where players take turns to make
their decisions, and each player makes a decision that is a best response to the opponent’s
decision one iteration before. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that this process will
converge; however, if it converges to a stable point, then it results in a Nash equilibrium. In
Table 14, we provide an algorithm that implements an iterative process that is similar to the
one discussed in Fudenberg and Tirole [28]. We iteratively search for the manufacturers’
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Table 14: Iterative procedure
Manufacturers’ equilibrium
1) Initialize the decisions of the manufacturers: wi = ci, Ki = 0, i = 1, 2.
2) Without loss of generality, start with manufacturer i = 2. Given the current decisions
of manufacturer 3− i, find the best response of manufacturer i by iterating over all
(wi,Ki) pairs and using the retailers’ equilibrium from steps 4-6. The best response of
manufacturer i is the (wi,Ki) pair that brings the highest profit. Update the values
of (wi,Ki) and repeat step 2 for manufacturer i = 1.
3) If the successive values of manufacturers’ profits do not differ more than a tolerance
level ε, stop.
Retailers’ equilibrium
4) Initialize the decisions of the retailers: Qj = 0; j = 1, 2
5) Without loss of generality, start with retailer j = 2. Given the current decisions of
retailer 3− j and the current decisions of the manufacturers (w1,K1, w2,K2), calculate
the best response of retailer j by using Equations 6-9. Update the value of Qj and
repeat step 5 for retailer j = 1.
6) If the successive values of retailers’ profits (or quantities) do not differ more than a
tolerance level ε, stop.
wholesale price and retailer incentive decisions, where we use the best responses of the
retailers in Equations 6-9 to find the retailers’ equilibrium.
Although the algorithm outlined in Table 14 does not guarantee convergence, in our
computational tests, we have always been able to achieve convergence. However, we have
also observed that the algorithm can converge to multiple equilibria depending on which
manufacturer takes the first turn in Step 2. We also note that multiple equilibria for the
retailers’ interactions are possible, although in our computational tests we have always
been able to achieve a unique stable point for the retailers’ equilibrium in response to
manufacturers’ decisions.
The iterative procedure helps us observe the manufacturers’ competitive actions in re-
sponse to each other. In Table 15, we give an example where one manufacturer’s higher
incentive triggers the other manufacturer to increase her own retailer incentive. In this
example, both manufacturers find it optimal to offer incentives in equilibrium, which sug-
gests that competition can be one reason for the manufacturers to offer incentives to their
retailers.
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Table 15: Best responses of the manufacturers towards equilibrium (a = 75, b1o = 3,
b1c = 2, b2o = 2, b2c = 1, c1 = 10, c2 = 10, m1 = 5, m2 = 5).
Iteration w1 K1 w2 K2
0 15 0 - -
1 15 0 41∗ 22∗
3 45∗ 10∗ 41 22
4 45∗ 10∗ 42∗ 25∗
It is interesting to investigate whether the incentives always increase the retailer’s profits
under competition. In Chapter 3, we showed in a monopolistic setting that the retailer earns
higher profit with the incentive only if the market potential is sufficiently low (a ≤ 3.5m+c),
while the manufacturer is always better off with the incentives than with no promotion. In
Example 3, we analyze the impact of the market potential on the manufacturers’ and the
retailers’ profits under competition, and observe a similar result to that in the monopolistic
setting.
Example 3 Table 16 compares the manufacturers’ and retailers’ profits and sales in the
no-promotion equilibrium versus the retailer incentive equilibrium, where the market poten-
tial takes “low” and “high” values. The manufacturers obtain higher sales and profits in
both cases when they offer incentives, whereas the retailers can achieve higher profits with
incentive only when a is “low”. Note also that the manufacturers’ wholesale prices are
higher with retailer incentives.
Table 16: Comparison of equilibria when no promotion is offered versus when both manu-
facturers offer retailer incentives, NP: No promotion, RI: Retailer incentive (b1o = 3, b1c = 2,
b2o = 2.5, b2c = 1, c1 = 12, c2 = 10, m1 = 6, m2 = 8).
w1 w2 K1 K2 Q1 Q2 ΠD1 ΠD2 ΠM1 ΠM2
NP 33.0 28.9 - - 4.2 7.6 69.3 140.7 88.2 142.9
a = 60 RI 36 32.7 3.6 12.8 4.8 9.0 61.2 126.0 111.6 191.4
NP 15.5 13.2 - - 0.7 1.3 5.4 12.3 2.5 4.0
a = 25 RI 18.5 16.9 3.6 8.5 1.3 2.3 7.9 18.24 4.9 7.3
In a competitive setting, Bruce et al. [12] study a different kind of dealer promotion
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that is in the form of wholesale price-cuts based on the retailer’s sales. Similar to Example
3, they also find that while the manufacturers are better off with trade promotions the
retailers are worse off when both manufacturers offer them.
Next question we analyze is how the retailer incentive affects the manufacturers’ sales
and profits when the incentive is offered by only one of the manufacturers. To answer
this question, we consider a scenario in Example 4 that mimics some characteristics in the
U.S. auto market. The American auto manufacturers are known to have higher production
costs ([78]), and it has also been found that they have higher price sensitivity in demand
than the non-American auto manufacturers (Keskinocak et al. [46]). In our example, we
assume manufacturer 1 has higher production cost and total price sensitivity compared to
manufacturer 2, and we fix the manufacturers’ wholesale prices at arbitrary values assuming
manufacturer 1 charges a higher wholesale price than manufacturer 2 as a result of higher
production cost. We compare three cases: (i) neither of the manufacturers offers any
promotion (Table 17(a)), (ii) only manufacturer 1 offers an incentive (Table 17(b)), (iii)
only manufacturer 2 offers an incentive (Table 17(c)). In Tables 17(b) and 17(c), we fix one
of the manufacturer’s incentive to zero and find the optimal value of the incentive offered
by the other manufacturer using the iterative procedure in Table 14.
Example 4 In Table 17(a), manufacturer 2 is the market leader and obtains higher profits
than manufacturer 1. In Table 17(b), the market leader does not offer any incentive but his
competitor does, then the market leader loses sales and profits while the competitor generates
additional sales and profits. In Table 17(c), the market leader is the only manufacturer
offering an incentive. The market leader further increases his sales and profits, although
the competitor’s sales and profits are not affected. The effects of incentives on the retailers’
profits are similar to those on the manufacturers’ profits across Tables 17(a)-17(c).
In Table 17(c), the market leader offers an incentive and encourages her retailer to
sell additional units to the customers who cannot afford the retailer’s reservation price.
As a result, the market leader expands her market. Manufacturer 1 does not provide
any incentive for her retailer to sell at prices lower than his reservation price; thus her
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Table 17: Effect of retailer incentives (w1 = 30, w2 = 20, a = 75, b1o = 3, b1c = 2, b2o = 2,
b2c = 1, c1 = 20, c2 = 10, m1 = 10, m2 = 10).
(a) No promotion
Q1 Q2 ΠD1 ΠD2 ΠM1 ΠM2
7 19 192.5 575.5 70 190
(b) K2 = 0
K∗1 Q1 Q2 Π
D1 ΠD2 ΠM1 ΠM2
10 9 18 212.5 544.5 80 180
(c) K1 = 0
K∗2 Q1 Q2 Π
D1 ΠD2 ΠM1 ΠM2
25 7 24 192.5 625.5 70 215
sales are restricted by the reservation price requirement and insensitive to his competitor’s
retailer incentive. Further, since retailer 1 makes his sales entirely on the first segment
of his demand function, the incentive given to retailer 2 does not worsen his situation.
Preceding observations suggest that the manufacturers with characteristics similar to those
of the American auto manufacturers can offer incentives to their dealers to improve their
profits and to compensate for their high wholesale prices and price sensitivities when their
competitor does not offer incentives.
4.3.3 Customer Rebate
In this section, we analyze the case where both manufacturers offer customer rebates. Re-
bates increase the purchasing power of the customers, thus increase the market potential, or
maximum price dealers may receive. However, as found in Keskinocak et al. [46], rebates of-
fered by one manufacturer may reduce the competitor’s sales and profits in a linear fashion.
We consider both effects by adjusting the demand function as shown in Equation 10.




(a+Ri−δjRj)−(bio+bic)Qi if Qi ≤ Qj
(a+Ri−δjRj)−bioQi−bicQj otherwise.
i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j.
(10)
While one manufacturer’s own rebates increase, her competitor’s rebates decrease the
customers’ willingness to pay, where 0 < δi ≤ 1 can be interpreted as the degree of sub-
stitution between the two manufacturers’ products. The decisions of the manufacturers
are w and R. The retailers’ equilibrium in response to the manufacturers’ decisions is
similar to that in the no-promotion equilibrium (Table 11), with a − wi −mi modified as
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a + Ri − δjRj − wi −mi, i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j.
We analytically characterize the SPNE in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 When both manufacturers offer customer rebates, there exists a continuum
of equilibria with wi−Ri = ci, wj = a−mi−ciδj +
a−δiRi−mj+cj
2 , Rj =
a−mi−ci
δj
, i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6=
j. When wi = ci, Ri = 0, there exists an equilibrium solution where manufacturer i obtains
zero profit while manufacturer j obtains monopoly profit, where wj = a−mi−ciδj +
a−mj+cj
2 ,
Rj = a−mi−ciδj .
See Appendix C for the proof. In the monopolistic setting the customer rebates are not
effective in increasing the manufacturer’s profits and sales when demand is deterministic
(Chapter 3). Proposition 2 shows that customer rebates can be highly effective when there
is competition.
In Table 18, we give examples of equilibria where one of the manufacturers offers high
rebates and generates monopoly profit while driving the competitor out of business. Note
that, in equilibrium any combination of wi, Ri such that wi −Ri = ci brings zero profit to
manufacturer i driving him out of business; however, the competing manufacturer’s (market
leader) sales and profits are sensitive to the individual values of wi and Ri. For example,
any Ri > 0 can hurt the market leader’s sales and profits as we demonstrate in Figure 23,
where w1 −R1 = c1 results in ΠM1 = 0 on all curves, but ΠM2 decreases as R1 increases.
Table 18: Equilibrium decisions and profits with customer rebates (a = 60, b1o = 3,
b1c = 2, b2o = 2.5, b2c = 1, c1 = 12, c2 = 10, m1 = 6, m2 = 8, δ1 = 0.5, δ2 = 0.5).
wi Ri Qi ΠDi ΠMi
Supply chain i = 1 117 84 7 115.5 147
SPNE 1 Supply chain i = 2 10 0 0 0 0
Supply chain i = 1 12 0 0 0 0
SPNE 2 Supply chain i = 2 115 84 8.4 155.4 176.4
Although one of the manufacturers can theoretically do very well by offering high cus-
tomer rebates, in practice it is more likely that the rebate amounts are limited by an upper
bound, e.g., the production cost. While we can identify the equilibrium decisions explicitly
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Figure 23: Continuum of equilibria with customer rebates
when there are no restrictions on the rebate values, when there are restrictions, the SPNE
is not equal to those characterized in Proposition 2. In the latter case, we use an iterative
procedure similar to the one outlined in Table 14 to find a stable point where none of the
firms would want to unilaterally deviate from.
We continue with the example in Table 18, but we restrict the rebate values by the
production costs for both manufacturers and show an equilibrium outcome in Table 19.
In this case, although manufacturer 1 is not driven completely out of the business under
rebates, she obtains lower sales and profits than those in the equilibrium of the no-promotion
case. The profits and sales of the market leader (manufacturer 2) are higher with the
customer rebate than no promotion.
Table 19: Equilibrium with customer rebates where R1 ≤ c1 and R2 ≤ c2, NP: No
promotion, CR: Customer rebate (a = 60, b1o = 3, b1c = 2, b2o = 2.5, b2c = 1, c1 = 12,
c2 = 10, m1 = 6, m2 = 8, δ1 = 0.5, δ2 = 0.5).
w1 w2 R1 R2 Q1 Q2 ΠM1 ΠM2
NP 33.0 28.9 - - 4.2 7.6 88.2 142.9
CR 30.5 39.1 0 10 3.7 7.7 68.5 146.6
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4.3.4 Retailer Incentive and Customer Rebate (Hybrid)
In practice, we can observe situations where manufacturers offer different types of promo-
tions. For example, as we also mentioned in Chapter 3, the American auto manufacturers
are well-known for their frequent and deep customer rebates, whereas the non-American,
especially Japanese, auto manufacturers seldom offer those and instead may give incen-
tives to their dealers. Manufacturers may have different characteristics; the American auto
manufacturers have higher production costs partly due to labor unions, and they sell to
customers who are more price sensitive to their products than those of the Japanese auto
manufacturers (Keskinocak et al. [46]).
One question is which promotion should the manufacturers choose in order to receive
high profits and sales. To answer this question, we analyze a scenario where we characterize
manufacturer 1 with low production cost and total price sensitivity and manufacturer 2
with high production cost and total price sensitivity; note the correspondence between the
former (latter) and the Japanese (American) auto manufacturers. Either manufacturer may
choose to offer a retailer incentive or a customer rebate, where the rebates are restricted by
the production costs of the manufacturers.
Table 20: Comparison of equilibria in different cases; manufacturer 1 has lower production
cost and total price sensitivity than manufacturer 2 (a = 75, b1o = 2, b1c = 1, b2o = 3,
b2c = 2, c1 = 10, c2 = 20, m1 = 10, m2 = 10, δ1 = 0.5, δ2 = 0.5).
w1 w2 K1 K2 R1 R2 Q1 Q2 ΠM1 ΠM2
Case 0 No promotion 35.3 42.5 - - - - 12.6 4.5 318.8 101.3
Case 1 Retailer incentive 39.8 47.5 25 10 - - 14.9 5.5 417.5 141.2
Case 2 Customer rebate 45.5 40 - - 10 0 12.8 4 325 80
Case 3 Hybrid (K1, R2) 40.2 42.4 25 - - 0 15.1 4.5 432.2 101.3
Case 4 Hybrid (R1, K2) 45 45 - 10 10 - 12.5 5 312.3 115
Table 20 shows the equilibrium decisions and the resulting sales and profits of the supply
chain members for the four combinations of promotions we have analyzed. In Figure 24,
we show the manufacturers’ profits. Manufacturer 1 consistently makes higher profits than
manufacturer 2 in all cases and obtains the highest profit when she offers a retailer incentive
while her competitor offers a customer rebate (Case 3). Manufacturer 1’s high profitability
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and market share are due to the advantages of low production cost and total price sensitivity
in demand. Manufacturer 2 is also better off with a retailer incentive but obtains the highest
profit in Case 2 when both manufacturers offer retailer incentives. Note that manufacturer 2
offers a retailer incentive in Cases 2 and 4, but obtains lower profit in the latter where
his competitor offers a customer rebate. This suggests that a customer rebate by one
manufacturer can have a significant impact on the competitor’s profits while a retailer
incentive has more impact within a supply chain than on the competitor. In other words,
the manufacturers are more vulnerable to their competitor’s customer rebates than their
retailer incentives.






























Figure 24: Manufacturers’ profits under various equilibria where manufacturer 1 has lower
production cost and total price sensitivity than manufacturer 2
4.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we analyze sales promotions in a competitive environment by considering
a duopoly setting. Our analysis extends the research in Chapter 3 where we studied sales
promotions in a monopolistic setting. We are motivated by the practices in the U.S. auto
industry where sales promotions play an important role in marketing and revenue manage-
ment strategies of auto manufacturers. Customer rebates and retailer incentives are two
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types of promotions commonly used by auto manufacturers to increase their sales and prof-
its when market demand is not strong. Customer rebates are per-unit payments from the
manufacturer to the end customers, which are used as instant discounts for all purchases.
On the other hand, retailer incentives are offered to dealers who have flexibility on whether
to transfer these payments to the purchase prices of the customers. One important char-
acteristic of our work is that we analyze a price discriminating retailer, which captures the
nature of sales based on negotiations between the dealers and the car buyers.
We analyze a competitive setting with two manufacturers who sell their products through
their exclusive but independent retailers. We model a single selling period where the retail-
ers make the order/sales quantity decisions upon observing the manufacturers’ wholesale
price and promotion decisions. We analyze several models with different promotion de-
cisions by the manufacturers. To understand competition under price discrimination, we
analyze a benchmark model with no promotion, which we also use to quantify the effect of
the promotions on the manufacturers’ and the retailers’ profits and sales. We use backward
induction and explicitly derive the expressions for the SPNE decisions. We find that under
certain market conditions two equilibria are possible, which determine the manufacturer (or
the retailer) which is the market leader in sales. We find that low production cost and price
sensitivity provide advantage to a manufacturer to achieve higher market share and profits.
This is also observed in practice where the American auto manufacturers with higher costs
and price sensitivities than the Japanese auto manufacturers obtain lower sales in compact
and midsize vehicle segments. We also find that manufacturers obtain lower profits when
there is competition than when they are monopolies. In another model, we analyze the case
where both manufacturers offer incentives to their retailers. We design an algorithm that
numerically converges to the equilibrium decisions in our computational tests, although no
convergence guarantee is provided. We observe that retailer incentives increase the manu-
facturers’ sales and profits, but they may reduce the retailers’ profits in some cases. We also
analyze the case where both manufacturers offer customer rebates. We find that customer
rebates can be effectively used by a manufacturer to drive the competitor’s profits to zero
while achieving high sales and profits. This implies that competition may be one reason
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why customer rebates are frequently offered in the auto industry. In the last model that
we study, we look at the case where one of the manufacturers offers a customer rebate and
the other a retailer incentive. We observe in numerical examples that the impact of the
customer rebates is more pronounced on the competitor’s profits and sales than the retailer
incentives. Our results suggest that the manufacturers with high cost and price sensitivities,
e.g., the American auto manufacturers, can improve their profits by offering incentives to
their retailers.
Our analysis has some limitations due to deterministic demand model and single-period
selling season. However, these simplifications enable us to focus on competition, which is an
important factor for the manufacturers’ decisions. We can extend our work in a multiple-
period model to investigate the effects of promotions on retailers’ sales over time periods
with different promotion offers. One extension area is to analyze other kinds of retailer
incentive promotions. For example, it is interesting to analyze cases where the competing




In this thesis, we studied models to analyze and control decentralized systems focusing on
issues in demand and revenue management. Decentralized systems operate according to the
actions and interactions of the system members who are equipped with localized decision-
making responsibilities, whereas centralized systems operate in an integrated way with a
single decision maker making system-wide decisions. There are several reasons for companies
or systems to decentralize their operations. For example, implementation of centralization
may be uneconomical for large systems since it may require high investment to store and
process data. In organizations, decentralization facilitates better accountability for actions
by independent departments since the responsibilities for certain decisions are clearly iden-
tified. The companies can use this accountability to motivate the members by rewarding
good performance, which eventually adds to the overall system efficiency. Distributing the
decision-making power to individual members may lead to fast decision-making in real time
which might be desirable for highly dynamic environments. To realize such advantages,
it is essential to address problems and issues arising in decentralized operations. One im-
portant problem observed in some cases is the misalignment of members’ objectives in the
system, which can deteriorate the system performance unless effective mechanisms are de-
veloped to account for possible conflicts. Our focus is on developing models to optimize
such mechanisms to improve the performance of decentralized systems.
In the first part of the thesis (Chapter 2), we considered a decentralized booking system
in the sea cargo industry. The system is composed of a central headquarters and sales
agents; the former assigns capacity limits and incentives to the sales agents, and the latter
independently handles the accept/demand decisions for the incoming demand requests and
chooses the route to transport the accepted cargo. Each sales agent contributes to the
revenue of the overall system and receives revenue based on the sales incentive assigned by
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the central headquarters. We focused on the perspective of the central headquarters, who is
concerned with utilizing the available resources most efficiently while maximizing the total
revenue generated in the overall system. We modelled the central headquarters’ capacity
allocation problem and analyzed several sales incentives to improve the decentralized system
performance. We developed heuristic methods to solve the firm’s capacity allocation prob-
lem, which we proved to be NP-hard. When designing heuristic methods, we characterized
agent behaviors depending on the sales incentives determined by the central headquarters.
We conducted extensive computational experiments to test our heuristics for systems with
various sizes and characteristics, and we observed that the heuristics performed reasonably
well and fast. We proved a worst-case result for an extreme instance where the number of
locations goes to infinity, which shows that the decentralized system performance can be
arbitrarily worse than that of the centralized system. However, in our computational ex-
periments with practical instances, we observed that the decentralized system performance
can be quite close to that of the centralized system, and a revenue per leg sales incentive
improves the decentralized system performance.
Our research in Chapter 2 is limited by its deterministic nature and can be extended by
introducing stochasticity to the booking process. In practice, uncertainty is observed in the
demand requests as well as in other operational issues relevant to the sea cargo practices,
for example, demand requests with unknown destinations. In stochastic settings, models
would be developed to facilitate dynamic space exchanges between the sales agents to make
the capacity available to the agents with high demand and revenue expectations. It may be
possible to incorporate strategic gaming by agents, or information mechanisms that may
further improve the decentralized system performance. Future research also includes the
analysis of other decentralized systems that could benefit from the design of optimization
models to explicitly capture agent behavior and mechanism design.
In the second part of the thesis (Chapters 3 and 4), we analyzed sales promotions by
manufacturers in decentralized supply chains. In such environments, due to decentraliza-
tion and non-direct sales of products through retailers, the manufacturers have the option
of whether to direct their promotions to the end customers or to the retailers. Promotions
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in the former case are generally defined as customer rebates and in the latter case as retailer
incentives. The auto industry in the U.S. is one example where both types of promotions
are offered by the manufacturers. Specific characteristics of the auto market such as an
oversupply of vehicles, largely fixed production costs of manufacturers, and intense compe-
tition, contribute to the extensive use of promotions as an important marketing strategy
by the companies. To obtain high market shares and profits, the companies need to know
which type of promotions benefit them most under which type of market conditions, as
well as how their profits and sales are affected by the competitors’ promotions. We stud-
ied these problems in two separate works. In the first part, we analyzed a setting with
a single manufacturer and single retailer, and we focused on the effects of promotions on
the manufacturers’ sales and profits. We analyzed several cases where the manufacturer’s
promotional schemes varied from no promotion to simultaneous use of customer rebate and
retailer incentive. We analyzed a base model with deterministic demand and found that the
manufacturer is always better off with a retailer incentive than a customer rebate. In the
more general model with uncertain demand, we found that either of the promotions can be
more profitable and generate higher sales for the manufacturer than the other depending on
the degree of uncertainty. One observation is that the customer rebate performs better than
the retailer incentive when uncertainty in a market potential parameter of demand function
is high. In the second part, we extended the analysis of promotions by analyzing a setting
with two competing manufacturers and two exclusive retailers that are also competitors in
the end market. Although our models realistically capture the interactions in practice by
incorporating competition at two stages of the supply chains, this complicates the analyt-
ics considerably. Therefore, we resort to computational schemes to find the equilibria and
gain insights through numerical examples. One of our analytical finding is that unlike the
monopolistic setting, the customer rebates can be highly effective even leading monopoly
profits for one manufacturer and zero profit for the competitor.
There are several directions that our research in sales promotions can be extended. First,
the models in Chapters 3 and 4 are single-period models, which are useful to obtain insights
while focusing on price discriminating retailers and competition. One extension would be
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to analyze the manufacturers’ promotional decisions in a multi-period model, where the
secondary market of vehicles is incorporated into the analysis along with price discrimina-
tion. In such a model, it would be interesting to investigate the effects of promotions on
the secondary market and the profits of the manufacturers from new vehicles. Within a
multi-period framework, another extension can be to analyze the customers’ strategic be-
haviors reacting to the manufacturers’ promotions over multiple periods. It would be useful
to analyze retailer incentives with other forms, such as incentives dependent on sales levels.
Future research also includes analysis of promotions with a demand model that is sensitive
to the retailers’ effort levels.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2
A.1 SCP Formulation
We use the decision variable yk to denote the number of containers accepted on O-D pair








yk ≤ cap,∀l ∈ L
yk ≤ dk, integer, ∀k ∈ OD
A.2 MR Heuristic
We formally describe the algorithm in Table 21. In implementation, we store the optimal AP
solutions of all agents, based on their most recent allocated capacities in a solutions array.
Table 21: Marginal revenue (MR) heuristic
1. Initialize the allocation vectors at zero (arp = 0, ∀p ∈ P , ∀r ∈ Rp).
2. For all p ∈ P , r ∈ Rp do
solve APp(~ap + stepsize · erp). Record the solutions in solutions array1.
3. Do begin











k (~ap + stepsize · erp) ≤ capr′ , ∀r′ ∈ R, l ∈ Lr′}
change = Z∗pmax(~apmax + stepsize · ermaxpmax)− Z∗pmax(~apmax)
if change > 0 then begin
~apmax = ~apmax + stepsize · erpmax
for all r ∈ Rpmax do begin
if (arpmax + stepsize ≤ capr · nvrmaxpmax) then
solve APpmax(~apmax + stepsize · ermaxpmax). Update solutions array for pmax.
end for
end if
end while (change > 0)
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A.3 POD Heuristic
In order to formally describe the algorithm in Table 22, we introduce the following notation:
rl denotes the booked capacity on leg l, dk denotes the remaining demand for O-D pair k,
wrk denotes the available space on route r that may be devoted to booking of O-D pair k.
As defined in Table 1, OD denotes the ordered set of all O-D pairs with non-increasing
prices, where the first O-D pair has the highest price. For easy representation, we consider
the routes with no particular order in the description of the algorithm. See discussion on
the POD heuristic in Section 2.3.2.2 for the choice of the order of routes.
Table 22: Priority OD (POD) based allocation heuristic
1. Initialization: arp = 0, ∀p ∈ P , ∀r ∈ Rp; rl = 0, ∀l ∈ L; dk = dk, ∀k ∈ OD;
wrk = capr, ∀r ∈ R, ∀k ∈ RRk
2. Starting with the first O-D pair in OD, for all k ∈ OD do begin
for all r ∈ RRk do begin




solve APopk(~aopk + min(w
r




yr∗m (~aopk + min(w
r





yr∗m (~aq) ≤ capr, ∀r ∈ R, l ∈ Lr) then begin
~aopk = ~aopk + min(w
r
k, dk) · eropk
dk = dk −min(wrk, dk)
rl = rl +
∑
{m∈ODopk∩Srl }





A.4 Proofs of Theorems and Remarks
For each O-D pair k, let ij be an alternative index where i = opk and j = dpk. Parallel to
Table 1, ODi is the ordered set of O-D pairs of the agent at port i, representing the priority
list of the agent under the total revenue incentive. Let OD′i represent the priority list under
the rev/leg incentive. We let F ∗SCAP(n) and F
∗
SCAP(n) denote the optimal revenue of the
SCAP solution with the total revenue and rev/leg incentive, respectively. We denote the
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optimal revenue of the SCP solution by F ∗SCP(n).
Proof. (Theorem 1)
In the example with travel sequence {1, 2, 3, .., n, 1}, let cap = 1 and dij = 1 ∀i, j : 1 ≤
i < j ≤ n and ∀i 6= 1, j = 1. Assume no demand exists for the other O-D pairs. We let
0 < γ < pn , 0 < ε <
p
n , and we define the parameters as follows:
p1n = p; pn1 = p− ε;
pi(i+1) = p− ε, ∀i = 1, .., (n− 1);
pij = p− ε + γ(|LLij | − 1), ∀(i, j) s.t: |LLij | > 1, (i, j) 6= {(1, n), (n, 1)}.
In this example, we show that limn→∞
F ∗SCAP(n)
F ∗SCP(n)
= 2p−εn(p−ε) = 0. First, note that: ODi =
{ODi1, ODin, ODi(n−1), .., ODi(i+1)}, ∀i : 1 < i ≤ (n − 1). Since capacity is 1, each agent
may at most receive an allocation of 1, which he will use to accept the highest priority
O-D pair of the agent, i.e., OD1n for agent 1, ODn1 for agent n, and ODi1 for the other
agents. However, since the highest priority O-D pairs of all agents except 1 and n share
at least one leg, these agents cannot be assigned a positive allocation at the same time in
a feasible solution. Therefore, the set of feasible solutions of SCAP with the total revenue
incentive is:
1. a1 = 1, an = 1, ai = 0, ∀i : 1 < i ≤ (n − 1). In this case, FSCAP(n) = 2p − ε with
accepted demand y1n = yn1 = 1 and yij = 0 for all other O-D pairs.
2. For each agent i : 2 ≤ i ≤ (n− 1), a feasible solution of the form ai = 1 with solution
yi1 = 1 and FSCAP(n) = pi1. The solution y21 = 1 and yij = 0, for all other O-D pairs
with objective value FSCAP(n) = p− ε + (n− 2)γ has the highest revenue in this set
of solutions.
Since γ < pn <
p
(n−2) ⇒ 2p − ε > p − ε + (n − 2)γ, the optimal solution value is
F ∗SCAP(n) = 2p− ε corresponding to the solution in 1 above.
Next we show that F ∗SCP(n) = n(p − ε), which corresponds to the optimal solution
y∗i(i+1) = 1,∀i : 1 ≤ i < n and y∗n1 = 1. For this instance, any accepted demand from
SCAP that is an O-D pair with more than one leg may be replaced by the 1-leg O-D
pairs occupying the same set of legs but with higher total revenue. This is possible in the
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centralized system because there is no need to incorporate agent behavior. In a solution,
if ODij demand is accepted, we can improve this solution by rejecting ODij demand and
instead accepting the |LLij | 1-leg OD demands since p− ε+(|LLij |−1)γ < |LLij |(p− ε) for
any (i, j) : |LLij | > 1, (i, j) 6= (1, n). This is also true for (1, n) since (2p−ε) < n(p−ε). Since
any solution that accepts an ODij with |LLij | > 1 may be improved by such replacements,
F ∗SCP(n) = n(p− ε). Therefore, we have that
F ∗SCAP(n)
F ∗SCP(n)
= 2p−εn(p−ε) , and the limit of this worst
case ratio approaches 0 as the number of ports grows.
Proof. (Remark 1)
In the example used for the proof of Theorem 1, OD′i = {ODi(i+1), ODi(i+2), .., ODin},
since pij|LLij | , ∀i : 1 < i ≤ (n−1) is decreasing. Since shorter O-D pairs have higher priorities,
the optimal centralized solution that accepts all of the 1-leg O-D pairs is feasible for the
optimal decentralized problem and is the best that is possible for the decentralized problem.
So, we can conclude that under the rev/leg incentive, in this problem F ∗SCAP(n) = F ∗SCP(n).
Proof. (Theorem 2)
We use the same network as in the proof of Theorem 1. We let ε ≤ pn , and we modify
the price parameters as follows:
p1i = (i− 1)p− (i− 2)ε, ∀i = 2, .., n;
pn1 = p;
pij = (j − i)( pn)− (|LLij | − 1)ε, ∀(ij) : |LLij | ≥ 1 and j > i 6= 1;
pi1 = (n− (i− 1))( pn)− (n− i)ε, ∀i = 2, .., (n− 1).









np−(n−2)ε = 0. Note that the priority
lists of the agents for the rev/leg incentive are the same as those in the proof of Theorem 1
since pij|LLij | is decreasing. If we give an allocation of 1 to each agent, each agent will satisfy
the demand for the O-D pair with the shortest travel.
With a similar argument as used for Remark 1, we may conclude that the optimal
SCAP solution is y∗i(i+1) = 1, ∀i : 0 ≤ i ≤ (n − 1) and y∗n1 = 1, and has objective value
F
∗
SCAP(n) = p12 +
n−1∑
i=2
pi(i+1) + pn1 = (3n−2n )p.
We next show that SCP has the optimal solution y∗1n = y
∗
n1 = 1, y
∗
ij = 0 for all other
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O-D pairs, with objective value F ∗SCP(n) = p1n + pn1 = np − (n − 2)ε. This result follows
from Remarks 3 and 4.
Remark 3 In the optimal solution of SCP for this example, yn1 = 1 ⇒ y1n = 1.
Proof. Assume first that ODn1 is accepted, then we have to find the best way of using
capacity from 1 to n. In total, there are 2n−2 combinations, but due to the structure of
the price parameters we can consider a limited set. We first show that the best use of ship
capacity between all ports (i, j):1 < i < (n− 1), i < j ≤ n is to accept all of the 1-leg O-D
pairs between i and j. We prove this by induction. There is only one choice of demand or
path from port (n − 1) to n. Since there is only one unit of capacity, the choice of which
demand to accept is equivalent to finding the longest path where distance is determined by
the price of the O-D pairs. First assume that the best capacity use from (n − i) ≥ 2 to
n is to accept the i 1-leg O-D pairs. i.e., {OD(n−i)(n−i+1), OD(n−i+1)(n−i+2), .., OD(n−1),n}.
We need to show that the best path from n − i − 1 to n is to use the (i + 1) 1-leg O-D
pairs, i.e., {OD(n−i−1)(n−i), OD(n−i)(n−i+1), .., OD(n−1)n}. If we choose to go from n− i− 1
to n − i + j,∀j : 0 ≤ j ≤ i, then by the induction hypothesis, the best path to n from
n− i + j is to choose the (i− j) 1-leg O-D pairs between those two ports. The path from
n− i− 1 directly to n− i + j and from n− i + j in the best way to n has a total revenue of
(j +1) pn − jε +(i− j)) pn = (i +1) pn − jε, which is maximized at j = 0. This means that the
best choice from n− i− 1 to n is to use all of the 1-leg O-D pairs between the two ports.
Now we find the best path from port 1 to port n. We consider a path that visits j. We
have shown that the best choice from j to n is to use all of the 1-leg O-D pairs between
the ports j and n. Then, the value of this path is (j − 1)p − (j − 2)ε + (n− j) pn , which is
maximized at j = n. Therefore, yn1 = 1 ⇒ y1n = 1.
Remark 4 Any solution of SCP with yn1 = 0 can be improved by modifying the solution
so that yn1 = 1.
Proof. If yn1 = 0, then exactly one of ODj1, j = 2, .., n − 1 must have been accepted.
Otherwise we can accept ODn1 without violating feasibility. Consider the path from j
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directly to 1, which has a value of (n − j + 1) pn − (n − j)ε. We can modify this path such
that it is composed of two partial paths: the first from j directly to n, and the second from n
to 1. The modified path has a value of (n−j) pn+p, which is greater than (n−j+1) pn−(n−j)ε;
therefore the SCP solution improves.














APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3
B.1 Proofs of key results
Proof of Theorem 3.
No Promotion : The results follow from the backward induction steps presented below.
Step 1. The retailer’s order quantity decision: Given w, find Q that maximizes




−b < 0). From first order conditions (FOC) we get Q = a−wb . Considering the upper bound














Step 2. The manufacturer’s wholesale price decision: Given the best response of









When a−w−mb ≥ 0, the objective function is concave in w (∂
2ΠMo
∂w2
= −2b < 0). It follows


















)2; ΠDo = (a−m−c)(a+3m−c)8b ; ΠSCo =
(a−m−c)(3a+m−3c)
8b .
Retailer Incentive: The results follow from the backward induction steps presented
below.
Step 1. The retailer’s order quantity decision: Given w and K, find Q that
maximizes the retailer’s profit by solving the problem (P2) in Section 3.3.1. ΠRI is con-
cave in Q (∂
2ΠR
∂Q2
= −b). From FOC we get Q = a−wb , and by considering the bound-













Step 2. The manufacturer’s wholesale price and retailer incentive decision:
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In order to solve the manufacturer’s problem, we proceed in two steps; first, we characterize
the optimal value for the retailer incentive, K∗, for a given w, and next, we find the optimal
wholesale price, by embedding K∗ in the manufacturer’s objective function and maximizing





min{ (w−c)22b , m
2




2Kb ≥ w − (a−m) where w ≤ a
0 if K ≤ m22b and
√
2Kb ≤ w − (a−m) where w ≥ a−m
m2
2b if K ≥ m
2
2b where w ≤ a.
(11)
Note that K∗ is identified under different cases which lead to different Q decisions.
Characterizing K∗ for a given w, in the second step, we find the optimal wholesale price,
wI , by embedding K∗ in the manufacturer’s objective function and maximizing it over w in
the subregions defined by the branching in Figure 25. (FS stands for “feasible solution”.)
FS.1 FS.2 FS.3 FS.4
FS.5
Figure 25: Decomposition of the feasible region for determining w in the deterministic
demand model with retailer incentive
To solve the manufacturer’s problem, we identify four cases and summarize the retailer’s
response in each case as follows:
Case 1) K ≤ m22b ;
√




Case 2) K ≥ m22b ; w ≤ a ⇒ Q∗ = a−wb
Case 3) K ≥ m22b ; w ≥ a ⇒ Q∗ = 0
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Case 4) K ≤ m22b ;
√
2Kb ≤ w − (a−m); ⇒ Q∗ = 0
The manufacturer has the feasible solution of setting w = c and K = 0, and receiving
zero profit. Therefore, we can omit Cases 3 and 4, since they can not do any better than
resulting in a profit of zero for the manufacturer.
Case 1) K ≤ m22b ;
√
2Kb ≥ w − (a−m); ⇒ Q∗ = a−w−m+
√
2Kb
b . First we solve for K:
(P3) max
K





s.t. 0 ≤ K ≤ m
2
2b√
2Kb ≥ w − (a−m)











≤ 0). From FOC, we obtain
the point K = (w−c)
2
2b . We have two cases to consider: w ≥ a − m and w ≤ a − m.










. Note that, the feasibility
condition for K ≤ m22b and
√
2Kb ≥ w − (a − m) to hold is w ≤ a. This condition and














. When w ≤ a−m, the second constraint becomes inactive and we







. Alternatively, by using the
assumption a ≥ c + m, we can show that K = (w−c)22b satisfies the second constraint, and
thus we can conclude that K∗ = min{ (w−c)22b , m
2
2b }.
Next, we solve for optimal w. We need to consider the following cases: w ≤ c + m and
w ≥ c + m, where K∗ = (w−c)22b and K∗ = m
2
2b respectively.
Case 1.a) w ≥ c + m
max
w





s.t. m + c ≤ w ≤ a
w∗ = max{m + c,min{a, a+c2 }} = max{m + c, a+c2 }










M = m(2a−3m−2c)2b .
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Case 1.b) w ≤ c + m
max
w
(w − c)(a−m− c
b
)− (w − c)
2
2b
s.t. c ≤ w ≤ m + c
w∗ = max{c,min{m + c, a−m}} = min{m + c, a−m}




M = m(2a−3m−2c)2b .







Case 2) K ≥ m22b ; w ≤ a ⇒ Q∗ = a−wb . First, we solve for K:
max
K
(w − c)(a− w
b
)−K





2b . Next, we solve for w:
max
w





s.t. c ≤ w ≤ a





4b . We denote
this feasible solution by FS.5.
We present all feasible solutions in Table 23. The SPNE in Table 4 (Section 3.3.1) is
the solution that is feasible in a region and has the highest profit. (In the last row of Table
23, the SPNE that dominates the feasible solution in the respective column is shown under
the title DS, standing for “dominating solution”.)




)+, and the man-





a + R− w −m
b
)+
We solve the manufacturer’s problem in a two-step procedure, where in the first step
we characterize the optimal rebate value given a wholesale price, and in the second step we
substitute the optimal rebate value back into the manufacturer’s profit function to solve for
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Table 23: All feasible solutions for the deterministic demand model with retailer incentive
FS.1 FS.5 FS.2 FS.3 FS.4
F.R: a ≥ 2m + c a ≥ m + c a ≤ 2m + c a ≥ 2m + c a ≤ 2m + c




















DS: - FS.4 FS.1 -
the optimal wholesale price. We find R = w− a+c−m2 . After back substitution, the objective
function becomes independent of w, and therefore any w,R satisfying wR − R = a+c−m2 is
optimal.
Proof of Observation 1 Observation 1(i) is trivial since Qo = QR and ΠMo = Π
M
R .
Observation 1(ii) follows from Table 24.
Table 24: Comparison of retailer incentive and customer rebate for the deterministic
demand model
a ≤ 2m + c a ≥ 2m + c
QI −QR (a−m−c)2b ≥ 0 m2b ≥ 0
ΠMI −ΠMR (a−m−c)
2
4b ≥ 0 m(2a−2c−3m)4b ≥ 0
ΠDI −ΠDR (a−m−c)(5m+c−a)8b ≥ 0 m(7m+2c−2a)8b ≥ 0 for a ≤ 72m + c
ΠSCI −ΠSCR (a−m−c)(a+3m−c)8b ≥ 0 m(2a+m−2c)8b ≥ 0
Proof of Theorem 4(i).
No Promotion





; j = l, h.
Case 1) w ≤ al −m ⇒ Qh = ah−w−mb ; Ql = a
l−w−m
b
Case 2) al −m ≤ w ≤ ah −m ⇒ Qh = ah−w−mb ; Ql = 0
Case 3) w ≥ ah −m ⇒ Qh = 0; Ql = 0
Note that we can omit Case 3 since the manufacturer has the feasible solution of setting
w = c and receive zero profit. We analyze Cases 1 and 2 and find the manufacturer’s
optimal wholesale price in each case.
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Case 1) w ≤ al −m ⇒ Qh = ah−w−mb ; Ql = a
l−w−m
b
max β(w − c)Qh + (1− β)(w − c)Qm
s.t w ≤ al −m
w∗ = min{al −m, βah+(1−β)al−m+c2 }
Case 1.a) (NP.1) β ≤ al−m−c












Case 1.b) (NP.2) β ≥ al−m−c









Case 2) al −m ≤ w ≤ ah −m ⇒ Qh = ah−w−mb ; Ql = 0
max β(w − c)Qh
s.t al −m ≤ w ≤ ah −m
w∗ = max{al −m,min{ah −m, ah−m+c2 }}
Case 2.a) (NP.3) ah − al ≤ al − m − c ⇒ w∗ = al − m; Qh = ah−alb ; ΠM =
β(al−m−c)(ah−al)
b






We summarize the feasible solutions obtained in different regions in Table 25.
Table 25: All feasible solutions for the uncertain market potential model with no promotion
























l ≥ ah + m + c 2al ≤ ah + m + c
Next, we show that the SPNE in Table 5 (Section 3.3.2) is the dominating solution in
the region it is feasible.
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• When al − m − c ≥ ah − al, it follows that β ≤ al−m−c
ah−al , and feasible solutions are
NP.3 and NP.1. The manufacturer chooses NP.1 since ΠM (NP.1) − ΠM (NP.3) =
(βah−(1+β)al+m+c)2
4b ≥ 0.
• When al − m − c ≤ ah − al, either β ≤ al−m−c
ah−al or β ≥ a
l−m−c
ah−al may hold. NP.4
is feasible in this region independent of the value of β. In addition to this, NP.1 is
feasible when β ≤ al−m−c
ah−al and NP.2 is feasible when β ≥ a
l−m−c
ah−al . Note the following:
ΠM (NP.4)−ΠM (NP.2) = β(ah−2al+m+c)24b ≥ 0.
ΠM (NP.1)−ΠM (NP.4) = (1−β)(β(ah−al)2−(al−m−c)2)4b
In the second equality, when β ≤ (al−m−c)2
(ah−al)2 Π
M (NP.1) ≥ ΠM (NP.4); otherwise
ΠM (NP.4) ≥ ΠM (NP.1).
Proof of Proposition 1















2A(ah−al)2 ≤ 0, where A =
√
(ah − al − 2m)2 + 4m(3m + 2c− 2al).
The inequality follows since al ≥ 2m + c ⇒ 3m + 2c− 2al ≤ 0, (ah− al − 2m−A) ≥ 0, and









A(ah−al)2 ≥ 0, where
A =
√
(ah − al − 2m)2 + 4m(3m + 2c− 2al). The inequalities follow since al ≥ 2m + c ⇒










((al−c)2+2m(ah−al−m))2 ≥ 0, since ah ≥ 2m + c ⇒ 2ah ≥ 3m + 2c.
B.2 Analysis of the model with market expansion
We model this situation with an increased market potential aD = (1 + α)a, α ≥ 0, when
the manufacturer offers a rebate R. In this case, the retailer’s best response to a given R,





. The manufacturer’s problem is to find the optimal
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When the manufacturer offers a customer rebate and the rebate leads to market expan-
sion, the SPNE is shown in Table 26.
Table 26: Equilibrium decisions when customer rebates expand market potential
a2 ≥ 4be or be ≤ a2 ≤ 2be a2 ≤ be or 2be ≤ a2 < 4be


























In Table 27, we compare the manufacturer’s profits and sales with the retailer incentive
and the customer rebate in two feasible regions and see that the manufacturer can be better
off with alternate promotions depending on the system parameters.
Table 27: Comparison of retailer incentive and customer rebate for the deterministic
demand model when rebates lead to market expansion
Condition ΠMI −ΠMR′ QI −QR′









B.3 Analysis of the model where ΠDI ≥ ΠDo is enforced in the equilibrium
In the equilibrium where there is no promotion offered by the manufacturer, the retailer
receives a profit equal to ΠDo =
(a−m−c)(a+3m−c)
8b . We analyze the case where the manu-
facturer offers an incentive K to the retailer while making sure that the retailer receives
a profit at least as high as ΠDo in equilibrium. From the analysis in Appendix B.1, the













Case 1) K ≤ m22b ;
√



















≥ (a−m− c)(a + 3m− c)
8b√















+ K ≥ (a−m−c)(a+3m−c)8b .
Note the correspondence with the problem denoted by (P4) and the problem denoted by
(P3) in the proof of Theorem 3 (Appendix B.1). We can show that the equilibrium denoted
by FS.1 that is found in the proof of Theorem 3 satisfies the additional constraint in (P4)
when 4m+2c ≤ 2a ≤ 7m+2c. When a ≤ 2m+ c, the equilibrium denoted by FS.4 satisfies
the additional constraint, therefore, they are also optimal for (P4) for the specified regions.
(These solutions are the equilibrium solutions in Table 4.)

















c ≤ w ≤ a
Note that the first constraint is to ensure that ΠDI ≥ ΠDo , i.e.,
∫ a−w
b
0 (a − bQ)dQ −
w (a−w)b + K ≥ (a−m−c)(a+3m−c)8b . We follow a two step procedure to find w∗ and K∗, where












2b ≥ (a−m−c)(a+3m−c)8b − (a−w)
2














s.t. 4w2 − 8aw ≥ −3a2 − 7m2 + 2ma− 2ca− 2mc + c2






2 if 2a ≤ 7m + 2c
a− 12
√
(a− c)2 + m(2a− 2c− 7m) if 2a ≥ 7m + 2c.
(12)
We find two feasible solutions which can be the equilibrium:
1. 2a ≤ 7m + 2c ⇒ w∗ = (a+c)22 ; K∗ = m
2
2b ; Q







2. 2a ≤ 7m + 2c ⇒ w∗ = a− 12
√









ΠD = (a−m−c)(a+3m−c)8b .
Case 2.b) m
2
2b ≤ (a−m−c)(a+3m−c)8b − (a−w)
2















s.t. 4w2 − 8aw ≤ −3a2 − 7m2 + 2ma− 2ca− 2mc + c2
c ≤ w ≤ a
We find one feasible solution which can be the equilibrium:
w∗ = a− 12
√








D = (a−m−c)(a+3m−c)8b .
In Table 28, we summarize the equilibrium solutions for the retailer incentive case when
the manufacturer ensures that the retailer receives a profit with the incentive that is at least
as high as that of the no-promotion equilibrium.
We compare the retailer incentive equilibria with the no-promotion equilibrium stated
in Theorem 3(i). We show that when 2a ≥ 7m+2c sales and manufacturer’s profit increase,
while the retailer’s profit remain the same when the manufacturer offers an incentive.
First, we show that QI ≥ Qo.
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Table 28: The SPNE for the deterministic demand model with retailer incentive when the
manufacturer ensures the profit in the no-promotion equilibrium for the retailer
a ≤ 2m + c 4m + 2c ≤ 2a ≤ 7m + 2c 2a ≥ 7m + 2c
wI a−m a+c2 a− 12
√

















































(a− c)2 + m(2a− 2c− 7m)
⇔ ((a− c)−m)2 ≤ (a− c)2 + m(2a− 2c− 7m) ⇔ m(m− 2a + 2c) ≤ m(2a− 2c− 7m).
The result follows since 2a ≥ 7m + 2c ⇒ −4a + 4c + 8m ≤ 0.
















(a− c)2 + m(2a− 2c− 7m) ≥ (a−c)2, since 2a ≥ 7m+2c. Therefore
ΠMI −ΠMo ≥ 0.
B.4 Analysis of fixed retail price
The analysis with perfect price discrimination has the demand function of the form P (Q) =
a − bQ. We model the alternative case where the retailer sets a fixed price r instead of
charging a different price for each unit that is equal to the customer’s willingness to pay.
For a fair comparison of these models, we derive the following correspondence between the
demand functions: r = P (Q) = a−bQ ⇒ Q = a−rb . Then, the retailer’s decision becomes to
find the optimal retail price instead. We make the same assumptions as in the base model
such as the retailer’s reservation price requirement, and analyze the no-promotion, retailer











s.t. r ≥ w + m
r∗ = max
{
w + m, a+w2
}













a− 2m,min{a−m+c2 , a−m
}}
Case 1.a) a ≤ 3m + c
w∗ = a−m+c2 ; r




Case 1.b) a ≥ 3m + c
w∗ = a− 2m; r∗ = a−m; ΠM = m(a−2m−c)b













2 , a− 2m
}
Case 2.a) a ≥ 4m + c
w∗ = a+c2 ; r




Case 2.b) a− 2m ≤ a ≤ 4m + c
w∗ = a− 2m; r∗ = a−m; ΠM = m(a−2m−c)b
The SPNE for the no-promotion case is summarized in Table 29. The SPNE for the
no-promotion case in perfect price discrimination setting is found in Section 3.3.1 as follows:















We can show that both the retailer and the manufacturer are strictly better off in terms
of profits and sales when the retailer has the ability to perfectly price discriminate versus
when he sets a fixed retail price, except when c + m ≤ a ≤ c + 3m, where the sales and the
manufacturer’s profit are identical in both models.
Table 29: The SPNE for the deterministic demand model with no promotion where the
retailer sets a fixed retail price
c + m ≤ a ≤ c + 3m c + 3m ≤ a ≤ c + 4m a ≥ c + 4m
wo
a+c−m


























































s.t. c ≤ w ≤ a− 2m
w∗ = min{a+c2 , a− 2m}; K∗ = 0
Case 1.a) a ≥ 4m + c
w∗ = a+c2 ; r
∗ = 3a+c4 ; K






Case 1.b) a− 2m ≤ a ≤ 4m + c
w∗ = a− 2m; r∗ = a−m; K∗ = 0; ΠM = m(a−2m−c)b ; ΠD = m
2
b





















a− w −m +
√







≥ K ≥ m

































2 − (a− w −m)2
4b
s.t. a− 2m ≤ w
(w − c)2 ≤ m2
w ≥ c
w∗ = max{a− 2m,m + c}
Case 2.a.1.a a ≥ 3m + c
w∗ = a− 2m; K∗ = 0; ΠM = a(a−2m−c)b
Case 2.a.1.b 2m + c ≤ a ≤ 3m + c












a− w −m +
√




s.t. a− 2m ≤ w
(w − c)2 ≥ m2
w ≥ c
Objective function becomes independent of w when K∗ = (a−m−c)(2w+m−a−c)4b . Any
(w,K) pair that satisfies the following relations is optimal with profit ΠM = (a−m−c)
2
4b :
K∗ = (a−m−c)(2w+m−a−c)4b ; w ≥ a− 2m; (w − c)2 ≥ m2; w ≥ a+c−m2 .
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s.t. K ≤ m
2 − (a− w −m)2
4b








a− 2m ≤ w ≤ a
c ≤ w
w∗ = max{a+c2 , a− 2m}
Case 2.b.1) a ≤ 4m + c
w∗ = a+c2 ; r
∗ = 3a+c4 ; K
∗ = 0; ΠM = (a−c)
2
8b
Case 2.b.2) a ≥ 4m + c
w∗ = a− 2m; r∗ = a−m; K∗ = 0; ΠM = m(a−2m−c)b
Summary of the SPNE:
• When a ≤ c + 3m, SPNE is the solution obtained in Case 2.b.1 (wI = a+c2 ; K = 0;











• When c + 3m ≤ a ≤ c + 4m, solution obtained in Case 2.a.2 or Case 2.b.1 can be the











For each region we can show that ΠMI ≥ ΠMo when the retailer uses fixed price. This is
identical to our result in the case of perfect price discrimination, where offering a retailer
incentive increases the manufacturer’s profits and sales. However, when the retailer sets a
fixed retail price, offering a retailer incentive does not always increase sales. (This result is
trivial to prove in cases that are not listed below.)






o follows since a − c ≤ 2m and
a− c ≤ 2a− 2c−m. Qo = a−m−c2b ≥ QI = a−c4b .
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• When c+2m ≤ a ≤ c+3m, (a−c)28b − (a−m−c)
2
4b is decreasing in a, and takes its smallest




4b ≥ 0 when a = c + 3m.
• When a ≥ c + 4m, (a−m−c)24b − (a−c)
2
8b is increasing in a, and takes its smallest value




8b ≥ 0 when a = c + 4m.
B.5 Analysis of the deterministic demand model with per-unit retailer
incentive
Let k denote the per-unit payment given by the manufacturer to the retailer for each unit
























In the next step, we solve the manufacturer’s problem in a two step procedure similar
to our analysis for the case of lump-sum incentive.




b ⇒ m2 ≤ k2 + 2k(a− w −m)
max
k
(w − c− k)
(
a− w + k
b
)
s.t. k ≥ (w − a)+
k2 + 2k(a− w −m)−m2 ≥ 0
k∗ = max
{
w − a+c2 ,−a + w + m +
√
(a− w −m)2 + m2
}





s.t. c + k∗ ≤ w ≤ a−m
(a− 2m− c)2
4
≥ (a− w −m)2 + m2
(k∗)2 + 2k∗(a− w −m)−m2 ≥ 0
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Note that when a ≥ 4m+ c, any w that satisfies a−m− 12
√
(a− c)(a− c− 4m) ≤ w ≤
a−m is a feasible solution with ΠMI = (a−c)
2
4b .
Case 1.b) a ≥ 2m + c; (a−2m−c)24 ≤ (a − w − m)2 + m2 ⇒ k∗ = −a + w + m +
√
(a− w −m)2 + m2
Case 1.c) a ≤ 2m + c ⇒ k∗ = −a + w + m +
√
(a− w −m)2 + m2
In Case 1.b and Case 1.c, c + k∗ ≤ w ⇔
√
(a− w −m)2 + m2 ≤ a −m − c. Note also
that c ≤ w ≤ a−m ⇒
√
(a−m− c)2 + m2 ≤ a−m− c, which is a contradiction. So there
are no feasible solutions obtained in these regions.




b ≥ 0 ⇒ m2 ≥ k2 + 2k(a− w −m)
max
k
(w − c− k)
(
a− w −m + k +
√
k2 + 2k(a− w −m)
b
)
s.t. k ≤ w − c




2(a−m−c) ,−a + w + m +
√




2(a−m−c) ≤ −a + w + m +
√
(a− w −m)2 + m2
max
w
(w − c− k∗)
(
a− w −m + k∗ +
√
(k∗)2 + 2k∗(a− w −m)
b
)
s.t. c + k∗ ≤ w ≤ a−m
(k∗)2 + 2k∗(a− w −m)−m2 ≤ 0
(w − c)2
2(a−m− c) ≤ −a + w + m +
√
(a− w −m)2 + m2
where k∗ = (w−c)
2
2(a−m−c) .







Note that w − 2a + 2m + c ≥ 0 conflicts with w ≤ a−m. Therefore, w − 2a + 2m + c ≤ 0.
max
w
(w − c)(−w + 2a− 2m− c)
2b
s.t. w ≤ a−m
(w − c)4
(2a− 2c− 2m)2 +
2(w − c)2(a− w −m)
(2a− 2m− 2c) −m
2 ≤ 0
(w − c)2
2(a−m− c) ≥ −a + w + m +
√






a−m if a ≤ 3m + c
a−m−
√
(a−m− c)(a + m− c) if a ≥ 3m + c
(13)
Case 2.a.1) a ≤ 3m + c ⇒ w∗ = a−m; k∗ = a−m−c2 ; Q∗ = a−m−cb ; ΠMI = (a−m−c)
2
2b
Case 2.a.2) a ≥ 3m + c ⇒ w∗ = a − m −
√
(a−m− c)(a + m− c); k∗ = a − c −
√





2(a−m−c) ≥ −a + w + m +
√
(a− w −m)2 + m2
max
k
(w − c− k∗)
(
a− w −m + k∗ +
√
(k∗)2 + 2k∗(a− w −m)
b
)
s.t. c + k∗ ≤ w ≤ a−m
(w − c)2
2(a−m− c) ≤ −a + w + m +
√
(a− w −m)2 + m2
where k∗ = −a + w + m +
√
(a− w −m)2 + m2.
Note that c + k∗ ≤ w ⇔
√
(a− w −m)2 + m2 ≤ a −m − c. Note also that c ≤ w ≤
a−m ⇒
√
(a−m− c)2 + m2 ≤ a−m− c, which is a contradiction. So there is no feasible
solution obtained in this region.
The SPNE solutions are summarized as follows:
• When a ≤ 3m + c, SPNE is the solution obtained in Case 2.a.1, where w∗ = a −m;
k∗ = a−m−c2 ; Q









(a− c)(a− c− 4m) ≤ w∗ ≤ a−m; ΠMI = (a−c)
2
4b .
We can show that in each region, ΠMI ≥ ΠMo . Therefore, the manufacturer is always
better off with a per-unit retailer incentive. (Same result holds for a lump-sum incentive.)
Moreover, when a ≥ 3m + c, the manufacturer’s profit is higher with a per-unit incentive
than a lump-sum incentive.
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B.6 Analysis of the retailer incentive case in the deterministic demand











((w + m)− (a− bQ))dQ ≤ ρK












Case 1) K ≤ m22bρ ;
√
2ρKb ≥ w− (a−m); ⇒ Q∗ = a−w−m+
√
2ρKb
b . First we solve for K:
max
K





s.t. 0 ≤ K ≤ m
2
2bρ√
2ρKb ≥ w − (a−m)
K∗ = min{ρ(w−c)22b , m
2
2bρ}. Next, we solve for w. We need to consider the following cases:






Case 1.a) w ≥ c + mρ
max
w








+ c ≤ w ≤ a
w∗ = max{mρ + c,min{a, a+c2 }}




















Case 1.b) w ≤ c + mρ
max
w
(w − c)(a− (1− ρ)w −m− ρc)
b
)− ρ(w − c)
2
2b
s.t. c ≤ w ≤ c + m
ρ
w∗ = max{c,min{c + mρ , a−m−(ρ−1)c2−ρ }}













Table 30: The SPNE for the deterministic demand model with retailer incentive when the
incentive pass-through rate is 0 < ρ ≤ 1


































Case 2) K ≤ m22bρ ; w ≤ a ⇒ Q∗ = a−wb . We obtain the following solution:
w∗ = a+c2 ; Q









We summarize the SPNE in Table 30.
Note that, ΠMR =
(a−m−c)2
4b . We can show that the manufacturer is better off with the
retailer incentive than the customer rebate where the equilibrium for the latter is stated in
Theorem 3(iii).
ΠMI −ΠMR = m(−2ρc+2aρ−mρ−2m)4bρ ≥ 0, when ρa ≥ 2m + ρc, since ρa ≥ 2m + ρc ⇒ 2aρ ≥
4m + 2ρc ≥ (2 + ρ)m + 2ρc.
ΠMI −ΠMR ≥ 0, when ρa ≤ 2m + ρc, since 0 < ρ ≤ 1.
B.7 Analysis of the no-promotion case, where demand can be in “high”,
“medium”, and “low” states with probabilities βh, βm, and 1− βh −
βm, respectively.
No Promotion





; j = l, m, h.
Case 1) am −m ≤ w ≤ ah −m ⇒ Qh = ah−w−mb ; Qm = 0; Ql = 0










Case 4) w ≥ ah −m ⇒ Qh = 0; Qm = 0; Ql = 0
Note that we can omit Case 4 since the manufacturer has the feasible solution of setting
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w = c and receive zero profit. We analyze the other cases and find the manufacturer’s
optimal wholesale price in each case.
Case 1) am −m ≤ w ≤ ah −m ⇒ Qh = ah−w−mb ; Qm = 0; Ql = 0
max βh(w − c)Qh







Case 1.a) (FS.1) 2am ≤ ah + m + c ⇒ w∗ = ah−m+c2 ; Qh = a
h−m−c
2b ; Q












max βh(w − c)Qh + βm(w − c)Qm







Case 2.a) (FS.3) βhβh+βm ≥
am−m−c
ah−am ⇒ w∗ = am − m; Qh = a
h−am
b ; Q




Case 2.b) βhβh+βm ≥
am−m−c
ah−am







l = 0; ΠM = (βh(a
h−al)+βm(am−al))(al−m−c)
b




; Qh = (βh+2βm)a
h−βmam−(βh+βm)(c+m)
2(βh+βm)b




; ΠM = (βha
h+βmam−(βh+βm)(m+c))2
4(βh+βm)b






max βh(w − c)Qh + βm(w − c)Qm + (1− βh − βm)Ql






Table 31: The SPNE with no promotion when demand can be in “high”, “medium”, and
“low” states with probabilities βh, βm, and 1− βh − βm, respectively.





m + (βh + βm)(m + c)
2am ≥ (1 + βh + βm)al ≥ FS.5, FS.6
ah + m + c βha
h + βma
m + m + c
2(βh + βm)a
l ≤ (1 + βh + βm)al ≤ FS.5
βha
h + βma
m + (βh + βm)(m + c) βha
h + βma
m + m + c
2(βh + βm)a
l ≥ FS.1, FS.6
βha
h + βma
m + (βh + βm)(m + c)
βh
βh+βm




m + m + c
2am ≤ 2(βh + βm)al ≤ (1 + βh + βm)al ≤ FS.1, FS.5
ah + m + c βha
h + βma
m + (βh + βm)(m + c) βha
h + βma
m + m + c
(1 + βh + βm)a
l ≥ FS.1, FS.6
βha
h + βma
m + m + c
βh
βh+βm




m + m + c



















l = 0; ΠM = (βh(a
h−al)+βm(am−al))(al−m−c)
b
We summarize the feasible solutions in Table 31. We give some examples to understand
the equilibrium behavior.
Example 5 We focus on the region where 2am ≥ ah + m + c, 2(βh + βm)al ≤ βhah +
βma
m + (βh + βm)(m + c), and (1 + βh + βm)al ≥ βhah + βmam + m + c. In this region two
feasible solutions are FS.5 (driven only by the high and medium states) and FS.6 (driven
by all states).
In Figure 26(a), we fix βm at a feasible value in the specified region, and plot ΠM with
respect to βh within the limits that are enforced by the feasible region. We see that when
βh ≤ β∗, FS.6 is the equilibrium solution, whereas when βh ≥ β∗ FS.5 is the equilibrium.
This observation is similar to Observation 2, where for β values that are greater than a
threshold value, the manufacturer is better off by the solution which is driven only by the
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w depends on  
w depends on  
w depends on  
w depends on  
βh
 
(a) With increasing ah
        
β* β** 
ΠM 
w depends on   
w depends on 
w depends on   
βh 
(b) No-promotion equilibrium wholesale price
Figure 26: No-promotion equilibrium wholesale price (m = 5, b = 2, c = 15)
Example 6 We focus on the region where 2am ≤ ah + m + c, βhβh+βm ≤
am−m−c
ah−am , 2(βh +
βm)al ≤ βhah + βmam + (βh + βm)(m + c), and (1 + βh + βm)al ≥ βhah + βmam + m + c.
In this region three feasible solutions are FS.1 (driven only by the high state), FS.5 (driven
only by the high and medium states), and FS.6 (driven by all states).
In Figure 26(b), we see that as βh switches from the range βh ≤ β∗ to the range β∗ ≤
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βh ≤ β∗∗, and to the range βh ≥ β∗, the equilibrium switches from FS.6 to FS.5, and to
FS.1, respectively. The equilibrium behavior is similar to Observation 2, where as β gets




APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 4
Demand Model with Competition: Consider the following demand models for two
competing firms:
Q1 = α− β1p1 + β2p2 (14)
Q2 = α− γ2p2 + γ1p1 (15)
Note that Q1 and Q2 denote sales quantities of firms 1 and 2, p1 and p2 are the prices set
by firms 1 and 2, β1 and β2 are own and cross price sensitivities of firm 1, γ2 and γ1 are own
and cross price sensitivities of firm 2, and α is the market size of each firm. Demand mod-
els in Equations 14 and 15 are commonly used in operations management literature (Kim
and Staelin [48] and McGuire and Staelin [57]), where the sales quantities are expressed as
functions of the prices, while our demand model in Equation 1 has the inverse representa-
tion relating the prices to each sales quantity. Although we cannot completely derive our
demand model from Equations 14 and 15, we can provide some intuitive explanation on the
correspondence between the two models.
We can assume that β1 ≥ β2 ≥ 0 and γ2 ≥ γ1 ≥ 0, which is similar to our assumptions
b1o ≥ b1c and b2o ≥ b2c (Section 4.3). We further assume that β1γ2−β2γ1 > 0. We consider
the first segment of our demand model, i.e., P1(Q1, Q2) = a− (b1o + b1c)Q1 corresponding
to the case where Q1 ≤ Q2.
When Q1 ≤ Q2 we use Equations 14 and 15 and derive the following expressions:
Q1 ≤ Q2 ⇒ ∃ ε ≥ 0 s.t : Q1 + ε = Q2
Q1 + ε = Q2 ⇒ −β1p1 + β2p2 + ε = −γ2p2 + γ1p1 ⇒ (β2 + γ2)p2 + ε = (β1 + γ1)p1 (16)
Q1 = α− β1p1 + β2p2 ⇒ p2 = Q1 − α + β1p1
β2
(17)
Substituting Equation 17 into 16, we obtain the following:
(γ2β1 − β2γ1)
β2





















In Equation 18, dependence of p1 on Q1 is similar to that in the expression P1(Q1, Q2) =
a − (b1o + b1c)Q1, where price is decreasing in sales quantity since β2(γ2β1−β2γ1) ≥ 0 and
γ2
(γ2β1−β2γ1) ≥ 0. Given Pi(Qi, Qj) = a − (bio + bic)Qi when Qi ≤ Qj , we can derive the
expression in the second part of the demand function (Qi ≥ Qj) in Equation 1 as follows:
a− (bio + bic)Qj − bio(Qi −Qj) = a− bioQi − (bio + bic − bio)Qj = a− bioQi − bicQj .
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. We show that the decisions of the manufacturers (w1 − R1 = c1 and w2 =
a−m1−c1
δ2
+ a−δ1R1−m2+c22 ; R2 =
a−m1−c1
δ2
) are best responses to each other. The best response
of manufacturer 1 when w2 = a−m1−c1δ2 +
a−δ1R1−m2+c2
2 and R2 =
a−m1−c1
δ2
is w1 −R1 = c1,
which follows from the following inequalities:
a + R1 − δ2R2 ≥ P1(Q1, Q2) ≥ w1 + m1 ⇒ a−m1 − δ2R2 ≥ w1 − R1 ⇒ c1 ≥ w1 − R1.
We also know that w1 −R1 ≥ c1 in equilibrium, therefore w1 −R1 = c1.
To find the best response of manufacturer 2 when w1 − R1 = c1, we consider the cases
with Q1 ≤ Q2 and Q2 ≤ Q1. In each case, we formulate the problem of manufacturer 2,
and we find an upper bound on his profit. We show that the decisions w2 = a−m1−c1δ2 +
a−δ1R1−m2+c2
2 and R2 =
a−m1−c1
δ2
are feasible and result in a profit equal to the upper bound.
Case 1) 0 ≤ a−δ2R2−c1−m1b1o+b1c ≤
a+R2−δ1R1−w2−m2
b2o+b2c











(w2 − c2 −R2)
(





a− δ2R2 −m1 − c1
b1o + b1c
))
s.t. c2 ≤ w2 −R2 ≤ a− δ1R1 −m2
w2 −R2
(







(c1 − a + m1) + (a− δ1R1 −m2)
R2 ≤ a−m1−c1δ2














can show that the optimal solution of this problem is w2 − R2 = a−δ1R1−m2+c22 , and the
objective function value is (a−δ1R1−m2−c2)
2
4b2o
. Note also that the objective function value of
manufacturer 2’s problem evaluated at w2 = a−m1−c1δ2 +
a−δ1R1−m2+c2




is equal to (a−δ1R1−m2−c2)
2
4b2o
. Next, we show that these w2 and R2 decisions satisfy the
constraints in the manufacturer 2’s problem. All constraints evaluated at the preceding
values of w2 and R2 reduce to the inequality R1 ≤ a−m2−c2δ1 , which holds by the feasibility
requirements in the formulation of the manufacturer 2’s problem.















(w2 − c2 −R2)
(
a + R2 − δ1R1 − w2 −m2
b2o + b2c
)
s.t. c2 ≤ w2 −R2 ≤ a− δ1R1 −m2
w2 −R2
(







(c1 − a + m1) + (a− δ1R1 −m2)
R2 ≤ a−m1−c1δ2








We can show that the optimal solution of this problem is w2−R2 = a−δ1R1−m2+c22 , and the
objective function value is (a−δ1R1−m2−c2)
2
4(b2o+b2c)
. Note that the feasible decisions w2 = a−m1−c1δ2 +
a−δ1R1−m2+c2
2 and R2 =
a−m1−c1
δ2




inate any decision in Case 2, and consequently we can eliminate this case.
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